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ABSTRACT
Deregulatory advocates often frame environmental protection
and economic well-being as a zero-sum tradeoff. During times of
economic crisis, including the long-term fallout from the global
Covid-19 pandemic, policymakers may seek to withdraw or roll
back environmental laws and regulations in an attempt to accelerate
economic recovery. In order to safeguard the interests of vulnerable
populations that suffer from pollution and other environmental
harms, it is imperative to retain environmental regulations,
removing or relaxing them only when there is a clear justification for
doing so.
Built into environmental legal frameworks in both international
and domestic law is a principle of non-regression—no walking back
environmental law, regulation, or protection once put in place.
Governments and institutions at all levels ought to apply this
principle in designing and implementing environmental
governance, and judges, in their role of interpreting and applying
the law, ought to incorporate the principle in their decisions and
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ensure the progressive realization of rights guaranteed by
environmental law.
This Article brings together a variety of expressions of the
principle of non-regression in international treaties, trade
agreements, declarations, and in domestic constitutions, statutes,
and administrative law—within and outside the United States.
Greater recognition of how this principle has worked in practice
may be helpful in promoting the notion that, so long as
environmental degradation continues to occur and threaten human
well-being, environmental standards must continue to move
forward and never look back.
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INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic presents a grave threat to the
environmental rule of law. 1 While the pandemic itself is not the
primary cause of social inequities or environmental crises, it has
exposed and exacerbated previously existing racial, gender, and
class-based injustices.2
As the initial social and governmental response to the pandemic
led to economic paralysis in the first several months of 2020,
researchers noted some temporary reductions in the level of air
pollution that coincided with the pause in industrial activities and
decrease in vehicle transportation.3 Lower air pollution emissions
make a significant difference for public health; in addition to the
estimated millions of premature deaths worldwide due to air
pollution each year, some preliminary evidence suggests that
pollution contributes to a higher risk of serious complications for
patients diagnosed with COVID-19.4
These reductions in pollution and consumption, however, were
temporary at best and do not reflect intentional, lasting structural
1
World Comm’n on Env’t Law, IUCN World Declaration on the
Environmental Rule of Law, ¶1, Feb. 12, 2017 [hereinafter IUCN World
Declaration],
https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/english_world_decl
aration_on_the_environmental_rule_of_law_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3YGUNT9]:

The environmental rule of law is understood as the legal framework of
procedural and substantive rights and obligations that incorporates the
principles of ecologically sustainable development in the rule of law.
Strengthening the environmental rule of law is the key to protection,
conservation, and restoration of environmental integrity. Without it,
environmental governance and the enforcement of rights and obligations
may be arbitrary, subjective, and unpredictable.
2
See, e.g., Max Fisher & Emma Bubola, As Coronavirus Deepens Inequality,
Inequality Worsens Its Spread, N.Y. TIMES (updated Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/15/world/europe/coronavirusinequality.html [https://perma.cc/PA44-H48S].
3
For example, in China, nitrogen oxide emissions fell sharply in March 2020.
See, e.g., Jonathan Watts & Niko Kommenda, Coronavirus pandemic leading to huge
drop in air pollution, GUARDIAN (Mar. 23, 2020, 8:01 AM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/23/coronaviruspandemic-leading-to-huge-drop-in-air-pollution [https://perma.cc/BS75-496R].
4
Alastair Lewis, What we do and don’t know about the links between air pollution
and coronavirus, CONVERSATION (May 12, 2020, 10:26 AM, EDT),
https://theconversation.com/what-we-do-and-dont-know-about-the-linksbetween-air-pollution-and-coronavirus-137746 [https://perma.cc/GU9U-USA9].
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changes in energy systems, industrial activity, social and economic
behavior, or policy.5 The consequences of the coronavirus and the
halting, insufficient, and inconsistent management of the public
health crisis in most of the world have been devastating: millions of
illnesses, serious disabilities, and deaths from COVID-196; countless
negative mental health impacts; widespread loss of employment
and economic security7; and socioeconomic upheaval.8
Furthermore, in the short-to-medium term, the policy response
to the coronavirus pandemic and the too-early, too-ambitious
resumption of economic activity carry with them the temptation to
relax social and environmental laws and regulations under the guise
of accelerating economic recovery. In moving toward eventual
long-term management of the pandemic and a “full” reopening after
successive waves of infection, the time has never been more
important to emphasize an emerging principle of human rights law
and environmental governance: the principle of non-regression.

5
In April 2020, due to economic closure, daily global emissions of carbon
dioxide decreased by roughly seventeen percent compared to 2019 averages. See
Corinne Le Quéré et al., Temporary Reduction in Daily Global CO2 Emissions During
the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 647, 647-48 (2020).
However, the study indicates that these reductions appear temporary, noting
forecasts that emissions will rebound, as has occurred with economic crises in the
past. Id. at 651-52.
6
Johns Hopkins University maintains data, updated daily, on the global
number of diagnosed COVID-19 cases and related deaths. See JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.
& MED. CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
[https://perma.cc/93L3-BQDH].
7
Kim Parker, Rachel Minkin & Jesse Bennett, Economic Fallout from COVID-19
Continues to Hit Lower-Income Americans the Hardest, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/09/24/economic-falloutfrom-covid-19-continues-to-hit-lower-income-americans-thehardest/#:~:text=Fully%2015%25%20of%20adults%20report,they%20are%20curre
ntly%20not%20employed [https://perma.cc/7DL9-3T6G].
8 See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz, They Were on Equal Footing. Then the Ground
Shifted,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
27,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/27/business/economy/unequal-economicrecovery.html
[https://perma.cc/BPT2-MZHC]
(chronicling
anecdotal
experiences of unequal economic experiences during the pandemic); see also
Catarina Saraiva, How a ‘K-shaped’ recovery is widening U.S. inequality, BRATTLEBORO
REFORMER
(Dec.
11,
2020),
https://www.reformer.com/opinion/columnists/catarina-saraiva-how-a-kshaped-recovery-is-widening-u-s-inequality/article_000e04fe-3b3a-11eb-bf65a31b3dc3d64b.html [https://perma.cc/HMV3-8BND] (describing asymmetry
between workers who have lost jobs and wealthy Americans who made major gains
in the stock market in 2020).
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In the midst of deepening environmental crises—including
anthropogenic climate change,9 biodiversity loss and extinctions,10
and impacts on human health from environmental pollution and
degradation—it is imperative to retain a guiding principle 11 that,
absent special circumstances, legal protection of the environment
must not be removed or reduced once it has been put in place. 12
Governments and institutions at all levels ought to apply this
principle—no regression, backsliding, or walking back
environmental protection—in designing and implementing
environmental governance. Judges, in their role of interpreting and
applying the law, ought to incorporate the principle of nonregression in their decisions in order to ensure the fulfillment of
rights guaranteed by environmental law.
This principle of non-regression dovetails with the mandate
toward progressive realization of human rights.13 In jurisdictions
that recognize a constitutional human right to a healthy
9
See generally Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) (2019),
https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/
[https://perma.cc/U8JD-CA3K] (detailing the impacts of a 1.5°C increase in global
warming and the importance of keeping the raise below that temperature).
10
See generally Summary for Policymakers of the Global Assessment Report on
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCI.-POL’Y PLATFORM ON
BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM SERVS. (IPBES) (2019), https://ipbes.net/globalassessment [https://perma.cc/9BMY-VHJH] (examining the status and trends
regarding biodiversity and its impact on human well-being).
11
In this work, I generally refer to “principles” in Dworkin’s sense,
distinguishing between legal principles and legal rules. According to Dworkin,
both principles and rules

point to particular decisions about legal obligation in particular
circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they give.
Rules are applicable in all-or-nothing fashion . . . [while principles state] a
reason that argues in one direction, but does not necessitate a particular
decision . . . . [W]hen we say that a particular principle is a principle of
our law, [we mean] that the principle is one which officials must take into
account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one direction or
another.
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25-26 (1967).
12
To note, in this Article, when referring to the non-regression principle, I
mean the idea that governments and other institutions must not reduce the level of
protection afforded by laws, regulations, and standards. This is in contrast to the idea of
non-degradation policies, which are that environmental quality (or the condition of
a specific ecosystem, species, or landscape) ought not be reduced. A legal nonregression principle may support non-degradation in some areas. The concepts are
complementary, but in discussing non-regression, the focus here is on law and
policy, as opposed to a scientific or ecological measurement.
13 See infra Part II.A.
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environment, 14 application of the non-regression principle is one
demonstration of how that right can lead to specific, concrete
outcomes in legislative, executive, and judicial decision-making. Of
course, principles of law are not absolute, and environmental law,
policy, and rights must coexist with other legitimate rights,
guarantees, and interests. It is therefore important to explore the
limits of the non-regression principle and its relationship with other
areas and objectives in the law.
The non-regression principle I am articulating here is not merely
aspirational.
International treaties, trade agreements, and
declarations explicitly include it, prohibiting backsliding in the level
of environmental protection. 15 Constitutions and national-level
statutes require it. 16
Given our ever-evolving scientific
understanding of the world and the interdependence of human life
and the ecosystems that surround us, we have greater reason to
pursue stronger environmental laws and regulations today than we
did in 1992 when the Rio Summit took place or in 1972 when the
United Nations first held a major international environmental
conference.
The purpose of this Article is to bring these expressions of the
non-regression principle in environmental law together, with the
intent that greater recognition and understanding of the concept will
lead to greater respect for the idea in global and local decisionmaking. While environmental degradation continues to threaten
quality of life and the quality of the environment for ourselves and
future generations, it is imperative, at a minimum, that
environmental law move forward as a response, rather than
backward.
This Article proceeds in four parts. First, it sets out an
introduction and definition of non-regression in environmental law,
identifying the legal foundations for this principle in human rights
law. Second, the Article discusses examples of the principle’s
application in international and comparative law: examples in
which international and domestic law constrain governments’
ability to walk back environmental protections. Third, the Article
turns to non-regression in U.S. environmental law. Although the
United States does not guarantee a constitutional right to
14
See, e.g., Nicholas Bryner, A Constitutional Human Right to a Healthy
Environment, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 168, 183 (Douglas Fisher ed., 2016).
15
See infra Part III.A-C.
16
See infra Part III.D.
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environmental protection, the core environmental statutes create
progressive obligations, pushing toward ever-tighter standards
over time and either prohibiting or erecting barriers against
regression of those standards. These anti-backsliding provisions are
bolstered by administrative law doctrine that requires reasoned
decision-making in changing regulatory policy—doctrine that has,
in practice, established a non-regression principle. Fourth, the
Article addresses criticisms of the principle and its limits. There are
practical and theoretical limitations to the idea of non-regression,
and it is important to reconcile the principle with other important
rights, theories, and legal concepts. In conclusion, the Article
returns to the present to apply the non-regression principle in the
context of economic crisis and recovery.
II.

LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NONREGRESSION

In 2016, the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s
World Commission on Environmental Law (IUCN WCEL) laid out
a definition for the principle of non-regression and its significance
for the enjoyment of human rights and for environmental
protection. According to the IUCN World Declaration on the
Environmental Rule of Law, in its most simple form, the principle is
that “States . . . shall not allow or pursue actions that have the net
effect of diminishing the legal protection of the environment or of
access to environmental justice.”17 Costa Rican environmental law
scholar Mario Peña Chacón offers the following explanation of the
principle:
The principle of non-regression or the prohibition of
regression affirms that environmental norms and
jurisprudence ought not change if so doing will mean
backsliding with respect to the level of protection already
achieved. It is intended to avoid removing or weakening
norms in favor of interests that have not been demonstrated
to be higher in importance than the public interest in the
environment, given that, in many circumstances, backsliding

17

IUCN World Declaration, supra note 1, princ. 12.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/1

2022]

Never Look Back

563

can lead to environmental consequences that are irreversible
or difficult to repair.18
This second definition suggests a connection between this
principle and concern for intergenerational equity. It also explains
that the principle of non-regression is not absolute, which addresses
and mitigates some criticisms of the principle19; it does not exist in a
vacuum but rather coexists with other considerations, requiring
proper and proportionate justification before walking back norms or
laws that affect the public’s interest in the environment.
The use of “principles” 20 suggests organizing concepts that
guide and support the application of a legal discipline or legal
system. 21 Thus, we might speak of fundamental principles of
constitutional law in the United States, “general principles of law”
in international law,22 or the basic principles of the rule of law.23 In
international environmental law, reference to principles is especially
common, both in soft law (dating to the Stockholm Declaration in
1972) and in major treaties, such as the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change.24
As a principle, the concept of non-regression has strong legal
foundation in human rights law. This connection is strongest where
human rights to environmental health and protection are
guaranteed, although human rights law is instructive, regardless of
18
Mario Peña Chacón, El Principio de No Regresión Ambiental en la Legislación y
Jurisprudencia Costarricense, in PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL
DESARROLLO, EL PRINCIPIO DE NO REGRESIÓN AMBIENTAL EN EL DERECHO COMPARADO
LATINOAMERICANO 12, 12 (Mario Peña Chacón ed., 2013) (translated from original).
19
See infra Part V.A.
20
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 22-31.
21
See, e.g., Principle, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1444 (11th ed. 2019) (“A basic
rule, law, or doctrine; esp., one of the fundamental tenets of a system.”).
22
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, Oct. 24, 1945, TS 993
(including “the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a
source of international law to apply in disputes before the court).
23
See generally What is the Rule of Law? The Four Universal Principles, WORLD
JUST. PROJECT, https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law
[https://perma.cc/7BKG-2BHC] (describing the principles that constitute the
universal definition of the rule of law).
24
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, annex II (June 16, 1972)
(including a list of 26 principles “for the preservation and improvement of the
human environment”); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 3, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (listing principles that parties to the
Convention “shall be guided” by “[i]n their actions to achieve the objective of the
Convention and to implement its provisions”).
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the circumstances, in explaining the importance of the principle of
non-regression and how it can apply in practice.
a. Progressive Realization of Human Rights
Since the beginning of the human rights era in the mid-20th
century and the creation of the United Nations system of
international cooperation and governance, international law has
consistently included an obligation for each State to undertake the
“progressive realization” of human rights. In the preamble to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN General Assembly
proclaimed that “all peoples and all nations” shall take “progressive
measures, national and international, to secure the[] universal and
effective recognition and observance” of human rights.25
Later, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights ratified the concept, requiring each Party to the
Covenant “to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to
the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization” of human rights. 26 In the InterAmerican system, the American Convention on Human Rights,
signed in San José, Costa Rica, in 1969, requires State Parties “to
adopt measures, both internally and through international
cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature,
with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other
appropriate means, the full realization” of human rights.27
The concept of progressive realization in the major human rights
covenants differentiates between those state obligations in
recognizing human rights that are immediate and other rights—
rights that states also have binding obligations to guarantee but that
may not be fully realized immediately. Despite this difference,
human rights law still requires states to make immediate and
continuous efforts, taking steps and dedicating resources toward the

25
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, preamble, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added).
26
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, ¶ 1,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (emphasis added).
27
American Convention on Human Rights art. 26, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (emphasis added).
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realization of those rights, recognizing that the implementation of
these measures may take time.
The idea of progressive realization for some categories of rights
is contentious: it can be used as an excuse for slow progress in
guaranteeing economic, social, and cultural rights. However, the
progressive nature of these obligations means that, once norms and
laws have been put in place to secure the right, the State now has the
duty to maintain the enjoyment of the right. According to Peña
Chacón, it is in this sense that the principle of non-regression is the
other side of progressive realization.28
b. Human Rights and Environmental Protection
In the past several decades, jurists in various parts of the world
have pointed to the link between, or rather, the interdependence of
environmental protection and human rights, in two ways. This
interrelationship between environmental health and human rights
in general is described by the first UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox: “Environmental
harm interferes with the enjoyment of human rights, and the
exercise of human rights helps to protect the environment and to
promote sustainable development.”29
First, because the environment—air, water, soil, and the
biosphere—is necessary for and supports human life, damage to the
environment implicates fundamental rights that include the right to
life and rights to health and safety. 30 Humans, individually and
collectively, therefore have the right to the continued maintenance
of the ecosystem services that support life.31 Indeed, many of the
judicial decisions around the world that connect the environment

Peña Chacón, supra note 18, at 16.
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of
Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy, and
Sustainable Environment, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/59, annex para. 1 (Jan. 24, 2018).
30
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6.1, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 (“Every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”).
31
U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, supra note 29.
28

29
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and human rights are rooted in the right to life and the duty of
governments to protect the life of their citizens.32
Second, the full enjoyment of human rights supports
environmental protection. Procedural rights and participatory
rights—including the right of access to information, to public
participation in decision-making, and effective access to justice33—
serve as important barriers to prevent many activities that would
cause environmental damage. These rights, though they may be
categorized as civil and political rights,34 have a profound impact on
the environment and on economic, social, and cultural rights by
providing effective checks on government action.
Building on and concurrent with these forays into the connection
between human rights and the environment, the recognition of a
human right to a clean and healthy environment has more clearly
established this interdependence.
The majority of national
constitutions now in place in the world establish such a right,
including nearly every constitution written or substantially revised
since the 1970s.35 In particular, many Latin American countries have
led the way with clearly conveyed environmental rights. Bolivia’s
Constitution of 2009, for example, provides:
Article 33. Everyone has the right to a healthy, protected, and
balanced environment. The exercise of this right must be
granted to individuals and collectives of present and future
generations, as well as to other living things, so they may
develop in a normal and permanent way.
32
See generally DONALD K. ANTON & DINAH L. SHELTON, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 436-544 (2011) (discussing and excerpting cases
from domestic courts and international human rights courts or bodies involving
substantive human rights and the environment).
33
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I,
princ. 10 (Aug. 12, 1992).
34
Various portions of the ICCPR address issues of due process, rights to
public participation, and access to information. See ICCPR, supra note 30, arts. 14
(equality before tribunals), 16 (right to recognition as a person), 19 (freedom of
expression), 25 (participation in the conduct of public affairs). Regional treaties in
Europe and Latin America specifically address the application of these “Rio
Principle 10” rights with regard to environmental matters. See Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to
Justice in Environmental Matters art. 1, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (adopting
the principles in a European treaty); Regional Agreement on Access to Information,
Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the
Caribbean art. 1 [hereinafter Escazú Agreement], Mar. 4, 2018.
35
See, e.g., Bryner, supra note 14, at 183.
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Article 34. Any person, in his own right or on behalf of a
collective, is authorized to take legal action in defense of
environmental rights, without prejudice to the obligation of
public institutions to act on their own in the face of attacks
on the environment.36
The Inter-American human rights system also recognizes a right
to a healthy environment. Article 11 of the San Salvador Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone
shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have
access to basic public services. The States Parties shall promote the
protection, preservation and improvement of the environment.”37
Paired with the substantive right to a minimum level of
environmental quality and health is the State’s obligation to
guarantee that right. The right to a healthy environment or an
ecologically balanced environment is a human right, whether with
individuals, communities, or entire nations as rightsholders.38 Yet
although this right is anthropocentric, enjoyed by and defined by
humans, the accompanying duty of progressive realization, applied
in this context, necessarily extends to the condition—the health,
integrity, and sustainability—of the environment.

36
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)'s Constitution of 2009, CONSTITUTE PROJECT
(2009),
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/642C-EX6W].
37
Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
art. 11, Nov. 14, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69. The Parties to the Protocol as of 2020 are
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. See Signatories and Ratifications, A-52 Additional Protocol to the American
Convention on the Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
“Protocol of San Salvador,” ORG. OF AM. STATES DEP’T OF INT’L L.,
https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-52.html
[https://perma.cc/MKP2-AM4B].
38
Some jurisdictions in the world, led most prominently by Ecuador, now
recognize “rights of nature,” centered not on humans but on other life and natural
objects as the subjects meriting legal protection. See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA
DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR], Oct. 20, 2008, arts. 7174, translated in Ecuador’s Constitution of 2008, CONSTITUTE PROJECT
(2008), https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021.pdf?lang=
en [https://perma.cc/HF4Q-JUKV]. Ecuador’s courts have begun, in the past few
years, to take on cases involving rights of nature claims, creating a fuller picture of
how rights of nature work in practice. See, e.g., Hugo Echeverría, Rights of Nature:
The Ecuadorian Case, 9 REVISTA DA ESCOLA SUPERIOR DA MAGISTRATURA
TOCANTINENSE 77 (2017) (Braz.).
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Because there can be no right to a healthy environment without
the protection of that environment, if the state bears the duty of
progressive realization of this right, there must necessarily be an
obligation to progressively enhance environmental protection and
prevent activities that may cause environmental damage. In other
words, when a government takes action to assure the human right
to a healthy environment, human rights law requires continuing to
advance toward full enjoyment of that right—and the principle of
non-regression prohibits any backtracking in this regard. Any
action that results in a reduction of legal protection for ecosystems,
biodiversity, air and water quality, or other component of the
environment, negatively impacts the right to a healthy environment,
and by so doing, violates the principles of progressive realization
and non-regression.
This human rights-based justification is a clear legal foundation
for the principle of non-regression in environmental matters in any
jurisdiction where a human right to environmental quality is
recognized. In these places, there is no debate; non-regression is a
fundamental concept underpinning the legal system—one that must
be applied together with other basic principles and concepts.
Yet even though the recognition of environmental rights is a
sufficient justification to apply non-regression, it is not the only
justification for applying the principle. As discussed further below,
in the context of administrative agency and executive branch
decision-making, statutory requirements and judicial doctrine may
yield a non-regression principle in practice. The rule of law
generally permits the revocation of laws: what a legislature enacts,
it may repeal by the same procedure. But in the administrative law
world, doctrine requiring a rational process for decision-making
will prohibit regulatory regression in environmental matters when
such changes lack scientific justification.
III.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION IN PRACTICE:
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW

Setting aside the theory and legal foundation for the principle of
non-regression, analysis of some examples illustrates the principle’s
development and application in practice. As with any other legal
principle, the principle of non-regression does not exist in a vacuum.
It coexists and correlates with other values, precepts, and
commitments. At the international level as well as in national-level
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constitutions, statutes, and jurisprudence, examples of the nonregression principle help provide the content and contours of the
requirement to not walk back environmental rules.
a. Non-Regression in Investment and Free Trade Agreements
First, at the international level, the use of the non-regression
principle is common in free trade agreements and investment
treaties.39 Andrew Mitchell and James Munro’s study in 2019 found
130 countries in the world with at least one investment treaty that
contained a non-regression provision with regard to environmental
protection.40 In these types of provisions, parties to the treaties agree
not to roll back environmental regulations (and other regulatory
standards related to labor laws, health and safety requirements, etc.)
in order to promote foreign investment in the country.
At the regional level, free trade agreements include similar
language. From the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which was in effect from 1994 to 2020:
The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or
environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or
otherwise derogate from, such measures as an
encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion
or retention in its territory of an investment of an investor. If
a Party considers that another Party has offered such an
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other
Party and the two Parties shall consult with a view to
avoiding any such encouragement.41
The new trilateral U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)
entered into force in July 2020 and maintains similar language: “[A]
Party shall not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive
or otherwise derogate from, its environmental laws in a manner that
39
Andrew D. Mitchell & James Munro, No Retreat: An Emerging Principle of
Non-Regression from Environmental Protections in International Investment Law, 50
GEO. J. INT’L L. 625, 625 (2019).
40
Id. at 629.
41
North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1114, para. 2, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289.
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weakens or reduces the protection afforded in those laws in order to
encourage trade or investment between the Parties.”42
These international, regional, and bilateral agreements have in
common the norm—the basic principle—that countries should not
roll back environmental protections that have already been put in
place in order to attract investment. This is environmental nonregression in practice. Non-regression in the investment and trade
context is not based on environmental rights or other human rights,
but rather on the necessities of effective cross-jurisdictional
cooperation.
The rationale for this type of cooperation is familiar in the
history of environmental federalism in the United States. Prior to
the advent of the major federal environmental statutes in the 1970s,
some states had begun enacting restrictions on sources of air and
water pollution and other environmental threats. One of the
motivating needs for federal legislation was to avoid a “race to the
bottom” in which other states, eager to attract investment or
business, would undermine environmental protection efforts by
adopting weaker standards—effectively subsidizing polluting
activities by failing to impose regulatory costs concomitant with the
social costs of pollution.43
Of course, despite the application of non-regression provisions,
other common norms and principles in investment and trade
agreements do not point toward greater environmental protection.
Under the GATT and now the WTO, international rules restrict the
use of non-tariff trade barriers and require equal treatment for “like”
products—generally without regard to the regulation of the
differences in environmental impacts across countries.44 Article XX
of the GATT, on its face, authorizes countries to impose

42
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) art. 24.4, para. 3, Jan.
29, 2020. The USMCA superseded the earlier agreement, NAFTA.
43
See Robert L. Glicksman & Jessica A. Wentz, Debunking Revisionist
Understandings of Environmental Cooperative Federalism: Collective Action Responses to
Air Pollution, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3, 4 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015) (discussing the “race to the
bottom” problem and the history of the Clean Air Act as a response).
44
General Agreement on Tariffs & Trade art. I, ¶ 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (“[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.”).
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environmental regulations that may have an impact on trade. 45
However, major examples, such as the conflicts over the import
restrictions of tuna (due to impacts on dolphins) and shrimp (due to
turtle bycatch) illustrate that free trade compliance systems exhibit
a strong bias against the establishment of new environmental
regulations, with a high bar to meet the GATT and WTO exemptions
for environmental non-tariff trade barriers.46
Environmental criticism of regional and global trade agreements
is widespread, and few would argue that free trade and investment
treaties are “pro-environment” in their drafting or in their impact.
It is precisely in this context that it is relevant to note—despite other
norms in trade law that cut against environmental protection—the
widespread prevalence of the principle of non-regression. In order
to maintain cooperation, once environmental standards are set—
with the rights-based obligation to progressively advance these
standards—most countries have committed to at least some form of
the idea that they cannot be rolled back simply to gain economic
advantage.
b. Examples in Multilateral Environmental Agreements
Negotiators in multilateral settings have pushed for the
enactment of non-regression provisions in binding environmental
treaties and conventions (as well as “soft law” environmental
declarations, discussed in the following section). The nonregression principle in international environmental law is based on
two ideas, both described earlier. First, under the human rights
principle of progressive realization, international environmental
law pushes toward ever-greater respect for environmental rights in
addressing issues of transboundary or global concern (e.g.,
transboundary air and water pollution, biodiversity loss, ozone

Id. at art. XX(g).
See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States–Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS21/R – 39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) (Mexico’s claim against the United States based
on U.S.-imposed “dolphin-safe” tuna restrictions); Report of the Panel, United
States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) (claim by several countries against the United States
for restrictions on shrimp, requiring fishers to use devices that protect sea turtles).
45

46
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depletion, and climate change). 47
Second, international
environmental law principles are intended to avoid the “race to the
bottom” described above and to avoid “free riding” among
countries that might employ less stringent measures but share in the
benefits of collective action with regard to the environment.48
i.

Washington Convention

Perhaps the earliest applied example of the non-regression
principle in international environmental law dates to the littleknown Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation
in the Western Hemisphere.49 Signed in Washington, DC, in 1940,
the Convention protects flora and fauna “in their natural habitat . . .
in sufficient numbers and over areas extensive enough to assure
them from becoming extinct” and “protect[s] and preserve[s]
scenery of extraordinary beauty, unusual and striking geologic
formations, regions and natural objects of aesthetic, historic or
scientific value, and areas characterized by primitive
conditions . . . .”50
Article II of the Convention addresses the establishment of
“national parks, national reserves, nature monuments, and strict
wilderness reserves” in each country. 51 Once countries have set
apart these protected areas, Article III of the Convention employs
the non-regression principle: “The Contracting Governments agree
that the boundaries of national parks shall not be altered, or any
portion thereof be capable of alienation, except by the competent
legislative authority.” 52 The non-regression obligation here is
narrow; it does not, by its terms, prohibit legislative action to revoke
47
For example, the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework on Climate
Change requires increased ambition in each round of nationally set climate
mitigation targets. See infra Section III.B.iii.
48
See, e.g., Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, Incentives to Participate in an
International Environmental Agreement, 9 ENV’T & RES. ECON. 153, 153-54 (1997)
(analyzing a model for international environmental negotiation and the extent to
which “side payments” from agreement participants to non-participants may
impact the “free-rider” effect).
49
Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the
Western Hemisphere pmbl., Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 229.
50
Id.
51
Id. at art. 2. These terms are defined in Article I of the Convention as
different classifications of protected areas.
52
Id. at art. 3.
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the creation of national parks or other protected areas. However, it
reflects a commitment by the nineteen parties to the Convention that
the setting aside of areas for environmental protection ought to be
permanent.53 Actions by presidents or other executive officials to
weaken those protections are illegitimate under the Convention;
only the legislature, which represents a more deliberative process—
and therefore should be less swayed by the prospect for short-term
political or economic gain—may act to reconsider, roll back, or
downsize the environmental commitment to preserving wildlife,
scenery, and other valuable public resources.
ii.

Escazú Agreement

The economic region of Latin America and the Caribbean has
recently formed an agreement on the rights of participation in
environmental matters: the right of the public to participate in
decision-making, the right to access to information, and the right to
effective access to justice. 54 Built on a negotiating platform
established at the Rio+20 UN Conference on Sustainable
Development in 2012, the Escazú Agreement is a treaty focused on
both environmental protection and on human rights.55
The Escazú Agreement advances the principle of non-regression
as a binding commitment in international environmental and
human rights law.56 Article 3 of the Agreement lists basic principles
53
The Organization of American States maintains the list of signatories and
ratifications to the Convention. Signatories and Ratifications, C-8: Convention on
Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, ORG. OF AM.
STATES DEP’T OF INT’L L., https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/c-8.html
[https://perma.cc/M7CS-4HER].
54
Escazú Agreement, supra note 34, art. 1.
55
At the Rio+20 conference, Latin American countries committed to open a
process toward a binding treaty to guarantee the “access rights” laid out in
Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. See
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, supra note 33, at annex I, princ.
10; U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development, Declaration on the Application of
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.216/13, annex I (June 27, 2012).
56
The Escazú Agreement required eleven ratifications among signatory
nations in order for it to enter into force. Escazú Agreement, supra note 34, at art.
22. On January 22, 2021, Argentina and Mexico deposited their ratification
instruments, becoming the 11th and 12th countries to do so. As such, the treaty
entered into force as of April 2021. See U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Lat. Am. and the
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of international law and environmental law that guide its
implementation—both in the interpretation of the Agreement’s
terms and in its application to each State.57 Among these are the
“Principle of non-regression and principle of progressive
realization.” 58 The Agreement further requires States to generate
and disseminate environmental information and, in so doing,
provides that “[e]ach Party shall guarantee that environmental
information systems are duly organized, accessible to all persons
and made progressively available . . . .”59
The direct mention of the non-regression principle in the Escazú
Agreement is an important milestone for the recognition and scope
of the principle. The Agreement is the first binding multilateral
treaty to explicitly incorporate non-regression with regard to
environmental protection. It also means that the principle is not
limited to the regulation of certain biomes or protected areas or to
one type of state action. Rather, the Agreement requires parties to
take appropriate measures to guarantee the full enjoyment of access
rights throughout the scope of the government’s authority, from
administrative decision-making to judicial systems.
To secure these rights is the treaty’s positive obligation of
progressive realization, and by applying the principle of nonregression, the treaty requires parties to maintain these measures
and keep them in place, with no backsliding.60 For example, under
the Agreement, if a country has established by law or policy a
system for public participation and consultation prior to the
construction of infrastructure or other developments that may cause
environmental damage, the State cannot exempt a project from the
established procedural requirements in the face of political or
economic pressure. Once the obligation is in place, derogation from
it violates the principle of non-regression.

Caribbean, ECLAC Celebrates Prompt Entry into Force of the Escazú Agreement
and Highlights the Region’s Commitment to Sustainable Development and Human
Rights (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.cepal.org/en/news/eclac-celebrates-promptentry-force-escazu-agreement-and-highlights-regions-commitment
[https://perma.cc/LN6L-VDJU].
57
Escazú Agreement, supra note 34, at art. 3.
58
Escazú Agreement, supra note 34, at art. 3(c).
59
Escazú Agreement, supra note 34, at art. 6(3) (emphasis added).
60
Escazú Agreement, supra note 34, at art. 3(c).
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iii. Paris Agreement
International negotiations under the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change have had a turbulent history since
the Convention was signed in 1992. Early success in the 1990s led to
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 that placed binding
targets on greenhouse gas emissions for the first time. These targets
were limited to developed countries and “economies in transition”
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 61 Although the
Kyoto Protocol eventually did enter into force a decade later when
it was ratified by Russia, 62 opposition by the United States, 63 in
particular, led to a move away from a uniform system of
quantitative emission reduction targets set by the UNFCCC parties
as a whole.
In the lead-up to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in
Copenhagen in December 2009, negotiators from Europe and other
parts of the world had hoped to put in place a second round of
targets with deeper emissions cuts and the inclusion of a greater
number of countries. By the time of the conference, however, the
Kyoto-style agreement had broken apart when the United States,
China, and other major emitters balked at the inclusion of a new
round of top-down targets.64
Instead, the 2009 meeting resulted in the short Copenhagen
Accord (negotiated at the last moments of the conference by a room
61
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162. The lists of applicable countries and
their numeric targets for the period of 2008-2012 were listed in Annex B to the
Protocol. Id. at annex B.
62
Per Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol, it entered into force ninety days
following the ratification of at least fifty-five Parties representing at least fifty-five
percent of the global total CO2 emissions in 1990 among the countries listed in
Annex I of the UNFCCC. Id. art. 25. This threshold was met when the Russian
Federation ratified the Protocol in November 2004; the Protocol therefore entered
into force in 2005.
See Russian Federation, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/node/61150 [https://perma.cc/P7CS-A9C5] (last visited Sept.
8, 2020) (listing the Russian Federation’s signature and ratification dates).
63
In the U.S. Senate, for example, the Byrd-Hagel resolution expressed “the
sense of the Senate” in opposition to the terms of what would become the Kyoto
Protocol as it was being developed; the resolution passed unanimously, 95-0. S. Res.
98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted), [commonly known as the “Byrd-Hagel”
Resolution]. The Senate never took any vote as to the ratification of the Protocol.
64
See, e.g., David Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global
Climate Governance, 10 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2010, at 4-6 (discussing
the setbacks on the “road to Copenhagen”).
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full of world leaders, including President Obama), which employed
what has been termed a “pledge and review” model of international
climate target commitments. 65 Rather than having a centrally
defined set of targets for all countries decided by the treaty body and
negotiators, individual countries make their own pledges that
become mutually reaffirming with pledges made by other parties to
the convention.66 Periodically, countries review their commitments
and make revised rounds of pledges.67
Climate advocates expressed considerable disappointment and
skepticism about the Copenhagen Accord as there is no
international authority for assessing the sufficiency of any country‘s
pledges and no accountability mechanism for the strength of the
pledges other than a sort of international “naming and shaming.”68
In the years that followed Copenhagen, momentum eventually built
toward negotiating a new agreement that would govern
international climate commitments beyond 2020. In November
2014, China and the United States boosted hopes for a global accord
when they announced a bilateral agreement under which the United
States would cut GHG emissions by twenty-six to twenty-eight
percent below 2005 levels by 2025 and China would peak its national
emissions no later than 2030, with cuts to follow.69
This joint announcement formed the two countries’ negotiating
positions and plans for the 2015 UNFCCC Conference of the Parties
in Paris.70 Based on this and extensive negotiating efforts around
the world, the 2015 Conference resulted in the near-universal

65
Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth
session, held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, ¶¶ 4-9, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1. The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC decided
simply to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord, rather than formally adopt it,
reflecting the division and disappointment among the parties at the outcome of the
meeting. Id. at ¶ 4.
66
Id. The Accord calls for targets to be listed in an Appendix, which appeared
simply as an empty table following the text as reported by the Conference of the
Parties, to be filled by countries on their own terms.
67
The Accord called for “an assessment” of its implementation by 2015. Id. at
¶ 7.
68
See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 6464, at 14-15.
69
See Press Release, The White House, U.S.-China Joint Announcement on
Climate Change (Nov. 11, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2014/11/11/us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/RQ9K-5QR8].
70
Id.
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adoption of the Paris Agreement.71 The Paris Agreement follows the
pledge and review process but takes the form of a binding
agreement in which each individual country develops its own
“nationally determined contributions” 72 of measures and actions
toward “achieving the purpose of the Agreement”: limiting climate
change to 2°C, or ideally to 1.5°C above pre-industrial global surface
temperatures.73
Although the Paris Agreement is subject to some of the same
criticisms as the earlier Copenhagen Accord, it expresses the nonregression principle and companion principle of progressivity
throughout its text. Early on, before specific obligations are listed,
Article 3 of the Paris Agreement states that “[t]he efforts of all Parties
will represent a progression over time, while recognizing the need
to support the developing country Parties for the effective
implementation of this Agreement.”74 Article 4 describes the main
obligation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) in greater
substance and detail. Paragraph 3 of that Article provides:
Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution
will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current
nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest
possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of
different national circumstances.75
As each round of a country’s NDC must represent a progression
beyond previous commitments, the Paris Agreement therefore is a
non-regression treaty; it prohibits backsliding or rolling back, so
long as the country continues to participate.76
71
Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
72
Id. at art. 4.
73
Id. at art. 2.
74
Id. at art. 3.
75
Id. at art 4.3.
76
Note, of course, that the Paris Agreement does allow countries to walk back
their climate commitment by withdrawing from the Agreement altogether. See id.
at art. 28. On November 4, 2019, the Trump Administration communicated to the
UNFCCC the United States’ intent to withdraw, which took effect on November 4,
2020 per the one-year minimum timeframe in Article 28. See Press Statement,
Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), https://2017-2021.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawalfrom-the-paris-agreement/index.html [https://perma.cc/TA79-LUQG].
Two
months later, on January 20, 2021, only hours after his inauguration, the new
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c. Environmental Non-Regression in Soft Law
In the broader field of international environmental law, the
principle of non-regression has been emphasized in soft law, in
global declarations and accords, particularly in the last decade. In
negotiations that have led to the development of new environmental
agreements, the principle is there, repeated as a reflection of state
custom in international environmental law.
As one prominent example, in the final outcome document from
the Rio+20 Conference on Sustainable Development in 2012 titled
“The Future We Want,” the UN General Assembly addressed the
concept, although not as directly as some environmental civil society
organizations and national-level negotiators had wanted. 77 The
result, in paragraph 20 of the document, is an
acknowledg[ment] that, since 1992, there have been areas of
insufficient progress and setbacks in the integration of the
three dimensions of sustainable development, aggravated by
multiple financial, economic, food and energy crises, which
have threatened the ability of all countries, in particular
developing countries, to achieve sustainable development.
In this regard, it is critical that we do not backtrack from our
commitment to the outcome of the [Rio Earth Summit of
1992]. We also recognize that one of the current major
challenges for all countries, particularly for developing
countries, is the impact from the multiple crises affecting the
world today.78
Some countries had wanted a clearer declaration against
regression of environmental standards but faced opposition from
the United States, Japan, Canada, and others in favor of the “do not
backtrack” language that eventually was added to the final
President Joe Biden signed a one-paragraph instrument re-accepting the Paris
Agreement.
The White House, Paris Climate Agreement, (Jan. 20, 2021)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/8D9U-DFWF].
77
See, e.g., Michel Prieur, Non-regression in Environmental Law, 5.2 SAPIENS 53,
55 (2012). Prieur describes the history of the provision leading up to the Rio+20
conference. The French government proposed including the principle in its
recommendations for the conference, and the Group of 77 + China proposed the
expression “principle of non-regression” during informal negotiations. After it was
removed, it was replaced with the language in paragraph 20. See id.
78
G.A. Res. 66/288, ¶ 20 (July 27, 2012) (emphasis added).
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document.79 Notably, the declaration, while not binding, refers to
the complexity of applying the principle of non-regression in the
face of “multiple crises” among many other challenges to achieving
sustainable development.80 As such, it is a recognition that political
and economic pressure to roll back environmental protection and
the enjoyment of environmental rights can be quite common;
balancing the application of the principle of non-regression with
other relevant legal principles and interests is critical in assessing
whether any “regression” may be justifiable, rational, and
proportionate under these circumstances.81
d. Examples in Domestic Law
At the national level in many countries, the non-regression
principle in environmental law is enshrined in constitutions,
statutes, administrative procedures, and in judicial decisions.
Ecuador and Costa Rica present contrasting examples—both of
which differ significantly from non-regression in the United States—
of how law and decision-making can reflect a commitment to the
non-regression principle.
i.

Ecuador

The Constitution of Ecuador is a reference point for the potential
to weave the principle of non-regression throughout national law.
In the Constitution of 2008—known internationally for its
recognition of the rights of nature 82 —Ecuador adopted an
exhaustive set of constitutional norms regarding the content of a
human right to the environment as well as procedural rights and
interpretive principles that support the implementation and
progressive enjoyment of environmental rights.83

See Prieur, supra note 7777, at 55.
See G.A. Res. supra note 78, at ¶ 20.
81
See discussion infra Part V (on the principle of non-regression in the context
of economic crisis during and after the COVID-19 pandemic).
82
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR, supra note 38, at arts. 71-74.
83
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR, supra note 38, at arts. 14, 32,
55, 66, 71-74, 395-407.
79
80

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:3

Article 11 of the constitution governs the exercise of
constitutional rights, laying out, among other principles, the idea
that “any [action] or omission of a regressive nature that
unjustifiably diminishes, [limits], or annuls . . . the exercise of rights
shall be unconstitutional.” 84 As environmental rights are spread
throughout the constitutional text, this general principle applies in
any circumstance in which executive or legislative powers in the
country act to reduce environmental protection.
ii.

Costa Rica

In Costa Rica, the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber (Sala
Constitucional) has incorporated the principle of non-regression in its
interpretation of the country’s constitutional human right to a
healthy and ecologically balanced environment. 85 Scholarship on
non-regression from Dr. Peña Chacón and Dr. Edgar Fernández
includes analysis of the leading cases.86
One prominent case began in 1996, when the country’s updated
Forest Act (Ley Forestal) provided for a reduction in the size of a
protected area. 87 The Constitutional Chamber struck down the
specific provision of the Act as unconstitutional, inconsistent with
the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment.88 The
court explained that the principle of non-regression applies to the
enjoyment of this right, and given the legal hierarchy that places the
Constitution as supreme over ordinary legislation, the legislature’s
attempt to shrink the protected area must fall. Notwithstanding the
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR, supra note 38, at art. 11.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA [CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA] Nov. 7, 1949, art. 50.
86
In 2013, the UN Development Programme published a book on
comparative application of the principle of non-regression in environmental law in
Latin America, edited by Dr. Peña Chacón. The book includes several chapters on
Costa Rica. See PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO, EL
PRINCIPIO DE NO REGRESIÓN AMBIENTAL EN EL DERECHO COMPARADO
LATINOAMERICANO 6-198 (Mario Peña Chacón ed., 2013).
87
Ley No. 7575, 13 Feb. 1996, Ley Forestal [Forest Act] art. 71. The case is
described in Edgar Fernández Fernández, Reflexiones Sobre el Principio de “No
Regresión Ambiental” en el Derecho Costarricense, in PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES
UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO, EL PRINCIPIO DE NO REGRESIÓN AMBIENTAL EN EL
DERECHO COMPARADO LATINOAMERICANO 89, 89-107 (Mario Peña Chacón ed., 2013).
88
Voto No. 7294-98 de las 16:15, 13 Oct. 1998, Sala Constitucional [Supreme
Court of Justice] [Costa Rica] (cited in Fernández, supra note 87, at 91).
84
85
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result, the court clarified that the principle of non-regression is not
absolute and not automatic; the court explicitly rejected the idea that
every move to undo environmental protections would be
unconstitutional.
Rather, before revoking or reducing
environmental requirements, proper justification and adequate
deliberation must be shown. The court noted in its opinion:
To reduce the size of any wild protected area, the Legislative
Assembly must do so based on sufficient technical studies
necessary to determine that such action will not cause harm
to or endanger the environment, and therefore, will not
jeopardize the [constitutional right to a healthy
environment].89
This description of the non-regression principle in
environmental law envisions that the appropriate decisionmakers,
with proper scientific basis, might conclude that relaxing legal
standards will not threaten the environment. It properly roots the
non-regression principle in the idea of preventing harm to the
environment, as opposed to simply preventing changes in the law.
Applying the principle of non-regression does not elevate prior
decisions or actions, making them immutable. Instead, as the Costa
Rican court understood, the principle is in place to avoid changes
that are unjustifiable. Based on new information, scientific studies
might conclude, for example, that a legal restriction has been
successful and run its course (making it no longer necessary),90 or
that the law created unintended side effects that undermined its
effectiveness as an environmental measure.91 In other words, Costa
Rica’s constitutional right to a healthy environment, together with
Id. (translated by the author).
A common and concrete example of this is the removal of protections for an
endangered species that has recovered to the point where regulation is no longer
necessary. In the United States, the text of the Endangered Species Act provides for
this, and several decades of practice show how the process has been implemented.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(b)(ii) (on the development of “recovery plans”). See also U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Service, Delisting a Species: Section 4 of the Endangered Species Act
(August 2002) (outlining the steps in the Service’s process for determining whether
to delist an endangered or threatened species). Delisting a species may be a
“regression” in protection but would not violate the principle of non-regression
when justified by scientific data.
91
The movement toward “adaptive management” in natural resources policy
includes the idea that some regulation ought to be flexible, allowing for iterative
analysis and revisiting to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of natural
resources management. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & Robin Craig, Designing Administrative
Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014).
89

90
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the principle of non-regression, prohibits regressive legislative
action unless it is rational and adequately justified to guarantee
continued environmental protection and enjoyment of the right.
IV.

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION IN THE UNITED
STATES

Environmental law in the United States provides a contrast to
the examples from Latin America. In the United States, of course,
there is no federal constitutional provision addressing the
environment or environmental concerns, despite several attempts to
include an environmental amendment since the 1970s. 92 Several
state constitutions include environmental rights and related
guarantees, such as public trust provisions on natural resources or
specific ecosystems;93 however, at the federal level, the Constitution
remains silent.
Lack of a federal constitutional provision on environmental
rights does not eliminate the application of the non-regression
principle in environmental law. It does mean, though, that there is
no broadly based right for courts to cite to (as is the case in Ecuador
or Costa Rica) as a constitutional mandate that would invalidate
regressive actions. Instead, to put it in practice, a court or other
decision-making body in the United States must find support for the
principle in statutes, regulations, or other legal authority.
Federal law either prohibits or discourages regression in
environmental protection in two distinct ways. First, substantive
environmental statutes and implementing regulations include antibacksliding provisions in the granting of environmental permits. 94
Second, the Administrative Procedure Act requires rationality in

92
See, e.g., Lynton K. Caldwell, The Case for an Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States for Protection of the Environment, 1 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 1, 2-4
(1991) (noting proposals in the House of Representatives in 1967 and 1968 and in
the Senate in 1970, as well as subsequent amendment ideas).
93
See, e.g., James R. May & William Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State
Constitutions, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 305, 315-21
(James R. May ed., 2011) (listing state constitutional provisions on environmental
and natural resources topics from twenty-three states and U.S. territories).
94
Examples from the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act—two of the most
complex regulatory statutes in the United States—are included below.
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agency decision-making, which provides a significant check on
agency efforts to undo or revoke environmental protections.95
a. Non-Regression in U.S. Environmental Statutes
Congress has written the non-regression principle into specific
provisions throughout the environmental law canon. Highlighted
here are examples from programs in the Clean Water Act and Clean
Water Act, two of the core statutes for pollution control in the United
States.
i.

Anti-Backsliding in the Clean Water Act

The Clean Water Act’s permitting program contains an oftencited example of statutory non-regression mandates. 96 Under
Sections 301 and 402 of the Act, any person that discharges a
pollutant into “waters of the United States” (essentially, water
subject to the Act’s jurisdiction) must obtain a permit from the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).97
Section 402 creates the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) for granting and reviewing permits for pollution
discharges.98 Under the Act, either the EPA or state environmental
protection agencies that have delegated authority from the EPA
establish limits based on technology standards indicated by the Act
that are written into a regulated party’s permit. For example, a
facility may have a permit that authorizes discharges only to a
maximum quantity of a pollutant per day or to a maximum
concentration or temperature.

95
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (providing the relevant standards for courts to set aside
administrative agency action).
96
See, e.g., Melissa A. Thorme, Antibacksliding: Understanding One of the Most
Misunderstood Provisions of the Clean Water Act, 31 ENV’T L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10322, 10324 (2001).
97
Clean Water Act §§ 301, 402, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342. Section 301(a) provides
that “[e]xcept as in compliance with this section and [various other sections of the
Clean Water Act], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). Section 502 of the Act provides definitions and scope for these
terms including a broad definition of “pollutant.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
98
33 U.S.C. § 1342.
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At least every five years, the EPA or relevant state agency must
review (and reissue, if appropriate) each NPDES permit. 99 When
doing so, the Clean Water Act prohibits any “backsliding” in the
permit100: “a permit may not be renewed, reissued, or modified . . .
to contain effluent limitations which are less stringent than the
comparable effluent limitations in the previous permit.”101 Unless
an exception in the statute applies, once an obligation to limit
pollution to certain level has been applied, a regulated facility
cannot negotiate a looser standard when it comes time to renew the
permit.102 The permit limit may be tightened, in other words, but no
backsliding is allowed.
ii.

Clean Air Act Non-Regression: NAAQS

The Clean Air Act also employs non-regression concepts in
regulating regional ambient air quality and in controlling pollutant
emissions from motor vehicles. Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA
sets National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for several
major pollutants,103 and state authorities develop plans and impose
restrictions either to work toward the attainment of the NAAQS or
to maintain current air quality if it is already adequate.104 The EPA
conducts a “complete and thorough review” of the NAAQS for each
pollutant every five years, based on updated scientific data, to
continue to provide standards that adequately protect human health
and the environment.105
While the EPA may relax the NAAQS for a pollutant, this is rare;
in a half century of Clean Air Act implementation, the trend has
been toward more stringent NAAQS as atmospheric scientists and
public health experts come to a better understanding of the impacts
of air pollution. When the EPA does decide to loosen a NAAQS,
Congress applied the non-regression principle in the Clean Air Act:
See id. § 1342(b)(1)(B).
See id. § 1342(o). This anti-backsliding mandate was first put in place by
EPA regulation and was formally added to the statute by Congress in 1987. See
Thorme, supra note 96, at 10323.
101
33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(1).
102
See id. at § 1342(o)(2).
103
42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409.
104
See id. at § 7410 (on the formation of “state implementation plans” for
meeting the NAAQS).
105
See id. at § 7409(d)(1).
99

100
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the EPA must put in place “anti-backsliding measures for all areas
that have not attained that standard as of the date of the
relaxation.”106 These measures “shall provide for controls which are
not less stringent than the controls applicable to areas designated
nonattainment before such relaxation.”107
The type of situation in which this anti-backsliding requirement
comes into play is complex and technical but illustrates the degree
and extent to which Congress followed the principle of nonregression in developing the Clean Air Act. As a recent example, in
2018, the D.C. Circuit applied the anti-backsliding provisions and
invalidated some of the actions EPA had taken in implementing the
NAAQS for ground-level ozone.108 In 2008, EPA had updated the
ozone NAAQS with a (generally) tighter standard than had
previously been promulgated in the 1997 ozone NAAQS. 109
However, because the 1997 standard had measured peak pollutant
concentrations over a one-hour period rather than taking the
average over an eight-hour period in the 2008 standard, there were
some areas out of attainment with the 1997 standard (with higher,
but shorter peaks in pollution levels) that were then “in” attainment
with the tighter 2008 standard.110
At the time, pursuant to the Clean Air Act, EPA retained the
restrictions that had been put in place for these areas under the 1997
standard to prevent any regression.111 When EPA removed these
restrictions in 2015, the D.C. Circuit found a statutory violation
because EPA could not relax these restrictions without a finding that
the areas in question had actually reached attainment with the
original 1997 standard.112

106
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 882 F.3d 1138, 1145
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(e)).
107
42 U.S.C. § 7502(e).
108
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 882 F.3d at 1143.
109
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 Fed. Reg. 16, 436
(Mar. 27, 2008) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 and 58) (setting a maximum
standard of seventy-five parts per billion (ppb) ground-level ozone measured over
an eight-hour period). The 1997 standard was eighty ppb. National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (July 18, 1997).
110
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 882 F.3d at 1148 (referring to these areas as
“orphan nonattainment areas”).
111
National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 73 FED. REG. 16,346
(Mar. 27, 2008) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 and 58).
112
S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 882 F.3d at 1147-1151.
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iii. Clean Air Act Non-Regression: Motor Vehicles
Title II of the Clean Air Act begins with a simple provision,
committing decision-making authority to the EPA about what air
pollutants to regulate from motor vehicle tailpipes and how to
regulate them. Section 202(a) calls on the EPA to
prescribe (and from time to time revise) . . . standards
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class
or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle
engines, which in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.113
This section dates originally to 1965—prior to the creation of the
EPA and to the establishment of most of the familiar Clean Air Act
programs that regulate stationary sources of air pollution. 114 In
1990, Congress overhauled the Clean Air Act, adding new titles and
hundreds of pages’ worth of changes; among these were added
provisions and new language in Section 202.115
The new language in 1990 established a progressive and nonregressive principle to be applied to any changes in pollution
standards for mobile sources like cars and trucks. Congress
specifically addressed the question of revising motor vehicle
emissions standards that the EPA had already put in place by
including the following sentence: “Any revised standard shall
require a reduction of emissions from the standard that was
previously applicable.”116 This was in keeping with the overall tenor
of the 1990 amendments. Members of Congress who drafted the
legislation viewed with disapproval the way in which air pollution
standards had languished in the 1980s after a decade of progressive
movement in the 1970s. 117 Therefore, the 1990 statute provided
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 77 Stat. 392 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C). On the history of the various additions and
amendments to the Clean Air Act, see Evolution of the Clean Air Act, U.S. EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act
[https://perma.cc/S78P-VPKL].
115
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399, 247283 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.).
116
42 U.S.C. § 7521(b)(1)(C).
117
See, e.g., GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN AIR ACT
OF 1990, at 80-81, 86, 90-91 (1993).
113

114
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much clearer, more specific directions to the EPA, limiting discretion
for changes and providing detailed lists of pollutants and other
priorities for the agency to address.118
The Trump Administration’s changes to fuel economy standards
and GHG emissions from cars put this non-regression provision to
the test.119 The joint EPA/NHTSA rules for new cars for the model
years 2021-2026, finalized in April 2020, were lower than what had
originally been established through 2025 by the Obama
Administration (in conjunction with the state of California, upon an
agreement with major auto manufacturers after the 2008 financial
crisis and recession). 120 However, based on the non-regression
requirement in Section 202, the agencies—even in their deregulatory
zeal—could not actually lower fuel economy requirements (in
comparison to what applied in prior years), but simply set in place
what would have been a weaker increase in fuel economy, at a
slower pace over the next several years. 121 While the Trump
Administration’s decision was a rollback in relation to the future
standards that had been put in place eight years earlier, the statute
at a minimum prevented regression in absolute terms.
In a more recent example, Congress enacted a non-regression
standard for motor vehicle emissions in the context of blending with
biofuels. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a Renewable Fuel
Standard (RFS) that mandated the blending of renewable biofuels
118
For example, the 1990 amendments to the hazardous air pollutants
program in Section 112 of the Clean Air Act included a list of nearly 200 specific
toxic pollutants that the EPA became required to regulate (rather than depending
on the EPA to make individual, pollutant-by-pollutant determinations that were
slow in coming). See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b).
119
See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model
Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 FED. REG. 24,174 (Apr. 30,
2020) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R pt. 86 and 600, and 49 C.F.R. pt. 523, 531,
533, 536, and 537). This rule has been superseded by the Biden Administration’s
EPA. See U.S. E.P.A., Revised 2023 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86 Fed. Reg. 74,434 (Dec. 30, 2021) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86 and 600).
120
See 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624
(Oct. 15, 2012) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R pt. 85, 86, and 600, and 49 C.F.R. pt.
523, 531, 533, 536, and 537).
121
For a brief description of the Trump Administration’s final rule, see The
Safer
Affordable
Fuel-Efficient
‘SAFE’
Vehicles
Rule,
NHTSA,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/corporate-average-fuel-economy/safe
[https://perma.cc/A2AK-RDF5] (noting that the rule provided for fuel economy
and GHG “standards that increase 1.5% in stringency each year from model years
2021 through 2026).
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into the gasoline supply in the United States.122 This was quickly
expanded in 2007 under the Energy Independence and Security
Act.123 The updated RFS places an obligation on gasoline refiners to
include an increasing volume of renewable fuels, with a mandate for
“advanced biofuels” that meet stricter EPA-measured standards for
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions below gasoline.124 Overall,
the RFS has been far less successful in inducing a transition to lowGHG renewable fuels than envisioned in the 2007 statute and has
instead been critiqued as a political favor to corn producers in the
United States.125
While intended as an energy security and a climate mitigation
measure, the expanded RFS brought a variety of criticisms, both
from the oil industry (concerned about increased competition) and
from environmentalists. Environmentalists have been concerned
that conversion of corn and other existing cropland to biofuel
production alters land use patterns in a way that encourages more

122
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat.
594 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o).
123
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121
Stat. 1492 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)). In addition to the anti-backsliding
requirement in the RFS program, the EISA also reinforced a progressive obligation
for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to set fuel
economy standards for new passenger cars and light trucks. Id. at § 102(a) (adding
49 U.S.C. § 32902(b)(2)(C)) (“Progress Toward Standard Required . . . . [T]he
Secretary shall prescribe annual fuel economy standard increases that increase the
applicable average fuel economy standard ratably beginning with model year 2011
and ending with model year 2020.”). NHTSA’s fuel economy standards were, at
least until 2020, set together with the EPA’s regulation of automobile GHG
emissions. See The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model
Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30,
2020) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86 and 600, and 49 C.F.R. pt. 523, 531,
533, 536, and 537). In the EPA’s new rule under the Biden Administration, agency
concluded that joint rulemaking was not necessary. See U.S. E.P.A., Revised 2023
and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 86
Fed. Reg. 74,434, 74,456-57 (Dec. 30, 2021).
124
Under the EISA, all renewable fuels must result in twenty percent lower
GHG emissions than gasoline based on EPA’s lifecycle analysis; “advanced
biofuels” must meet a fifty percent reduction standard. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7545(o)(1)(B),
7545(o)(2)(A)(i). In addition to the requirements for gasoline, the statute also
includes a smaller mandate for the use of biodiesel.
125
The renewable fuels program in the Clean Air Act has created a continued,
guaranteed market for a large quantity of corn-based ethanol in gasoline, which
qualifies for the twenty percent standard but not the fifty percent advanced biofuels
standard. The statute gives EPA considerable flexibility to waive the requirements,
which has resulted in frequent waivers that undermine any technology-forcing
element of the RFS.
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intensive or expansive agriculture elsewhere.126 In addition, higher
concentration of ethanol blended into gasoline affects engine
performance in cars and trucks and changes the emissions profile
for these vehicles.127
As a result, in the 2007 statute, Congress called on EPA to
undertake a “study to determine whether the [RFS] . . . will
adversely impact air quality as a result of changes in vehicle and
engine emissions of air pollutants.”128 Congress followed up in the
statute with a requirement, after the study is complete, to
“promulgate fuel regulations to implement appropriate measures to
mitigate, to the greatest extent achievable, considering the results of
the study . . . any adverse impacts on air quality, as the result” of the
RFS, unless the EPA makes “a determination that no such measures
are necessary.”129
EPA’s understanding of this provision in the Clean Air Act
reflects the non-regression principle. The agency itself refers to the
study as the “Anti-backsliding Study.” 130 With this requirement,
Congress has recognized that when it tweaks regulatory programs
for air pollution, it intends to ensure that there is no regression or
walking back of progress made. Even while adding another goal to
the Clean Air Act (i.e., encouraging the use of renewable fuels to
enhance U.S. energy independence and reduce GHG emissions from
fossil fuels), the statute prescribes a way to ensure that
complementary environmental regulations for conventional tailpipe
emissions from motor vehicles remain effective and as protective as
before.
In short, major federal environmental statutes in the United
States are organized around a principle of non-regression. The
Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and other major regulatory
126
See, e.g., Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels
Increases Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 1238
(2008).
127
For example, the EPA considered these impacts in 2019 while expanding
the “waiver” under the Clean Air Act for the use of E15 gasoline in a greater variety
of vehicles and circumstances (gasoline that contains fifteen percent ethanol, as
opposed to the typical E10 or ten percent ethanol). See Modifications to Fuel
Regulations to Provide Flexibility for E15; Modifications to RFS RIN Market
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 26,980 (June 10, 2019).
128
See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(v)(1)(A).
129
Id. at § 7545(v)(2).
130
US E.P.A., Clean Air Act Section 211(v)(1) Anti-backsliding Study, EPA-420R-20-008 (2020), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi?Dockey=P100ZBY1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QZ5-6QSJ].
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programs are geared toward progressive realization of human
health goals and improvement in environmental quality. Where
areas remain relatively unaffected by pollution, the statutes provide
for maintenance and protection 131 ; in areas suffering the impacts
from decades or centuries of development and industrial activity,
the statutes contain policies for continual improvement, even if
many of the most ambitious goals have yet to be realized.132
b. Administrative Law as Non-Regression
As discussed throughout this Article, the non-regression
principle in environmental law is not absolute. As one principle
among others in a legal system, the non-regression principle bars the
weakening or revocation of legal protections unless those changes
are adequately justified—whether by new scientific and policy
understanding of human health and environmental challenges or by
conflicts between existing environmental legal protections and other
public needs that outweigh the public’s environmental interests.
In the United States, one key function of administrative law is
judicial oversight of administrative agencies’ use and application of
scientific or technical information in the implementation of
regulatory and statutory mandates. 133 When agency decisions
threaten a regression from established environmental protections,
administrative law takes on a non-regressive character and
represents the most frequent U.S. application of the non-regression
principle in practice.
Administrative law doctrine in the United States under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 134 is based on principles of
transparency and rationality in government agency decision131
See, e.g., the Clean Air Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration”
program for areas currently in attainment of the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492.
132
The Clean Water Act, for example, called for a complete elimination of
water pollution—a mandate of zero discharge by 1985. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (“it
is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters be
eliminated by 1985”).
133
5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (establishing the scope of judicial review of agency
actions, findings, and conclusions); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (interpreting the APA to require courts to “consider whether
[an agency] decision was based on a a consideration of the relevant factors and
whether there has been a clear error of judgment,” i.e., to take a “hard look” at
agency decisions).
134
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.
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making. The APA, as the name suggests, lays out procedural
requirements for government agencies to follow in fulfilling their
respective mandates and implementing federal statutes and
programs. Critically, however, the APA also provides a cause of
action for interested parties to challenge agency action and seek
judicial review. Section 706 of the APA describes the relevant
standard of review; for judicial review of substantive decisions in
“informal” 135 rulemaking and adjudicatory processes, this judicial
inquiry is known as the arbitrary and capricious standard.136
On its face, the arbitrary and capricious standard is neither pronor anti-regulatory. Yet this neutral standard has evolved into a
form of “non-regression-lite” in practice: once administrative
agencies put environmental or public health protections in place,
they tend to “stick”137 because scientific evidence will rarely support
walking back those regulatory protections.138 While administrative
law does not contain an explicit non-regression mandate, statutory
and case law in this area largely follows the principle, allowing
regressive decisions only in the exceptional case—in circumstances
135
The APA provides for formal, trial-like processes for certain categories of
adjudications or rulemaking processes. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57. In common
administrative law parlance, “informal” action refers to a rulemaking or
adjudication that is not subject to these procedural requirements. The rest of the
APA and any other subject matter-specific statutory procedures still apply.
136
As explained below, the Administrative Procedure Act has served as a
strong, nearly constitutional-like foundation for administrative law in the United
States since its enactment in 1946. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATT’Y GEN.,
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947). It
directs courts to set aside agency action that is, among other things, “arbitrary,”
“capricious,” or beyond the scope of constitutional or congressionally delegated
statutory authority. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D). The standard in Section 706(2)(A) is
typically described as “arbitrary and capricious” review.
137
See, e.g., Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85 (2018).
138
For examples, one need only look at one of the dozens of cases since 2017
in which courts have struck down Trump Administration efforts to revoke or stay
the implementation of environmental regulations. Administrative law doctrine
generally defers to agency actions, interpretations, and decision-making. Yet the
Trump Administration had a shockingly low success rate of 12 out of 110 (eleven
percent) in court cases reviewing federal agency actions as of July 2020. See
Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY,
https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last visited Aug. 14, 2020)
[https://perma.cc/8FLN-G3ZD]. On the Trump Administration’s aggressive use
of a variety of tactics to roll back administrative agency rules and policies, see
Bethany A. Davis Noll & Richard Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV.
1 (2019); Bethany A. Davis Noll & Alec Dawson, Deregulation Run Amok, INST. FOR
POL’Y
INTEGRITY,
Nov.
2018,
at
1-2,
https://policyintegrity.org/publications/detail/deregulation-run-amok
[https://perma.cc/8REQ-G47T].
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when justified or, in some instances, when courts have opted to
defer to agencies’ deregulatory policy objectives.139
Under the APA, agencies that promulgate rules of general
applicability (the case for most environmental regulatory actions
taken by the EPA and environmentally-consequential actions by
land management agencies) must follow at least three steps: (1)
provide notice to the public of a proposed rule or action; (2) receive
public input via submitted written comments and/or hearings; and
(3) publish the final rule or action, typically in the Federal
Register.140
Broadly speaking, when an agency that has an environmental
regulation in place seeks to make a change, administrative law does
not permit that agency to instantly revoke the current regulation.
The procedural essence of administrative law requires that every
action follow the proper pathway.141 The Supreme Court, in State
Farm and subsequent precedent, has made clear that a decision to
revoke or walk back a regulation triggers the APA’s rulemaking
provisions and requires the same procedural steps to act as the
decision to regulate in the first place.142
The process by itself does not establish a principle of nonregression in administrative law decisions regarding the
environment. An agency can choose to follow the same steps used
by predecessors and revoke or withdraw an environmentally
protective rule. However, the process sets up the APA’s substantive
constraint on administrative decision-making—judicial review.143
In carrying out the notice-and-comment rulemaking process,
administrative agencies must engage with and make decisions
139
Chevron deference, of course, in its namesake case, was about deference to
the EPA’s deregulatory reinterpretation of the Clean Air Act in a way that served a
particular policy goal of flexibility for regulated industry. Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
140
5 U.S.C. § 553 (providing for the rulemaking process).
141
The APA defines “rule making” to include “agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule,” making clear that the same procedural
requirements apply when an agency wants to repeal a prior rule. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)
(emphasis added).
142
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983) (invalidating an agency decision to undo safety restraint
requirements for motor vehicles).
143
The APA provides jurisdiction for judicial review of “final agency action,”
for those who are “suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute.” 5
U.S.C. §§ 704, 702. Section 706 describes the scope and standards for judicial review.
Id. at § 706.
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based on the evidence before them. 144 The Supreme Court has
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard in the APA as a means
for ensuring that those decisions are rational or reasonable
conclusions, adequately based on the evidence and on congressional
directives.145 Two of the Court’s listed factors in the arbitrary and
capricious test in State Farm are indicative: “Normally, an agency
rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency . . . entirely
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem [or] offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency . . . .”146
The arbitrary and capricious standard, in practice, operates as a
non-regression mandate any time an agency attempts to rescind an
existing environmental standard. The first time an agency moves to
implement an environmental statute, it will be operating on a clean
slate. Judicial deference doctrines are, in these circumstances,
strong: generalist judges are loath to substitute their judgment for
that of technical experts.147 What happens, then, when an agency
revises or rolls back an existing regulation in its second or third
crack at the issue?
In theory, in administrative law jurisprudence, a court’s review
of an agency’s “second try” regulation follows the same standard as
that for the first. In FCC v. Fox, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court’s
plurality that not “every agency action representing a policy change
must be justified by reasons more substantial than those required to
adopt a policy in the first instance.”148 However, in practice, the bell
of regulation cannot be un-rung, and the field is no longer level.
Challengers to the regulatory regression have the added
ammunition of pointing to a full and complete administrative record
of the agency’s first decision to regulate—one that likely passed
muster in earlier judicial review.

144
Agencies must be able to justify their decisions based on the record before
them at the time the decision was made, rather than by post hoc rationalizations.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (commonly referred to as Chenery I).
In State Farm, the Court understood Chenery II to say that a “reviewing court . . .
may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has
not given.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947) (commonly
referred to as Chenery II)).
145
State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43.
146
Id.
147
See id.
148
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009).
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Recognizing this, a more practical reading of Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Fox reflects a reality that there will often be a preference
for non-regression. Although a decision to rescind a rule may not
be subject to greater scrutiny than the decision to regulate, the Court
still maintained that an agency must “display awareness that it is
changing position.”149 Even if the agency does not need to prove
that there are “better” reasons for the revocation than the original
policy, “the agency must show that there are good reasons for the
new policy.”150
In effect, for an environmental regulation, this means that an
agency cannot simply ignore the evidence in front of it that had
supported an environmental restriction or standard in the first
place.151 Unless there is new or updated scientific understanding,
the decisionmakers must still account for the evidence that
supported the original protection of public health or the
environment. 152
Consider again the example of the joint
EPA/NHTSA fuel economy standards for new cars.153 The relevant
statute for NHTSA requires that the agency set the standard at “the
maximum feasible average fuel economy that the [agency] decides
the manufacturers can achieve in that model year.”154 In this statute,
Congress leaves the factfinding to the agency as expert, providing
guidelines as to how a determination of “maximum feasible” is to
be made.155 The agency must make tradeoffs among several factors
in deciding what is feasible.
Given a clean slate, two different administrations could
reasonably come up with different answers. When the Obama
Administration’s NTHSA and EPA first set rules for model year cars
through 2025, the agencies put together a robust explanation of the

Id. at 515 (emphasis in original).
Id.
151
Id.; see also Davis Noll & Revesz, supra note 138, at 6-7.
152
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. at 516 (“[A] reasoned
explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or
were engendered by the prior policy.”)
153
See supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
154
49 U.S.C. § 32902(a).
155
The statute requires NHTSA to consider “technological feasibility,
economic practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the
Government on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve
energy.” See id. at § 32902(f).
149

150
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feasibility of a high fuel economy standard.156 That explanation was
reaffirmed in January 2017. 157
Shortly thereafter, Trump
Administration officials at the agencies indicated that they would be
revising those findings, 158 and in 2020, a new rule—with a
significantly lower level of fuel economy averages required—was
finalized.159
Deferential judicial review—neutral as to the environmental
impacts of any change—looks simply at whether the agency
provided an adequate justification for the new rule.160 That is the
Fox test. But the substantive statutory standard—“maximum
feasible average fuel economy”—has not changed, and the agencies’
prior findings remain part of the record. As a result, because
Congress set the level at the “maximum,” an objective review of
such a rolled-back regulation would require employing the nonregression principle.
Without new scientific or technical
information that calls the earlier decision into question, or without a
clear showing that other, more significant principles or public
concerns outweigh the environmental considerations, no rolledback standard can possibly be a reasonable implementation of the
statute’s clear mandate.
The result of this review is consistent with other expressions of
the non-regression principle discussed in this Article. That is, the
principle is not an unqualified rule, and does not prevent or prohibit
all forms of legal regression with regard to environmental
protection. 161 However, any walking back of environmental
standards must be justified with evidence showing that the new
decision will not harm the environment or public health and/or that
the regressive action is supported by principles and welfare
156
U.S. EPA & NHTSA, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 77
Fed. Reg. 62, 624 (2012).
157
U.S. EPA, Final Determination on the Appropriateness of the Model Year
2022-2025 Light-duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards Under the
Midterm Evaluation (Jan. 2017), EPA-420-R-17-001.
158
U.S. EPA & NHTSA, Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final
Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,671 (Mar.
22, 2017).
159
U.S. EPA & NHTSA, The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles
Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg.
24,174 (Apr. 30, 2020).
160
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
161
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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concerns greater than that guaranteed by the non-regression
principle.
Administrative law doctrine in the United States therefore
includes a form of non-regression principle. This has become more
significant in recent years, given the frequency of policymaking by
agencies and the decline in congressional decision-making. 162
However, the administrative law principle is limited in scope. The
non-regression principle comes not from any constitutional
mandate, but rather from the strength of the substantive
environmental statutes (with language such as “maximum”163 and
“best” 164 ) and the standard of judicial review. 165
While
administrative law restrains arbitrary decisions to revoke
environmental protections, judicial review of agency actions does
not provide any constraint on legislative action.
V.

CRITIQUES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REGRESSION

The examples above in international and national-level law
illustrate the widespread use and recognition of the non-regression
principle in environmental law, regardless of whether it is so named
explicitly in constitutions and jurisprudence. There are at least two
criticisms of the principle that warrant discussion here before
moving further: one normative and one descriptive. A theoretical
and normative challenge to the principle is what may seem to be a
conflict with democratic values. Non-regression restricts policy
options that can be taken in the future, even if withdrawing or
rolling back environmental protection might be, on some occasion,
democratically favored.
Second, descriptively, the major
environmental rollbacks in the past several years that have occurred
in the United States and in other major countries (developed and
162
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., MODERNIZING THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT 3 (2020) (discussing proposals for APA reform and noting an “imbalance” in
the prevalence of regulatory action vs. congressionally enacted statutes); see also
Davis Noll & Revesz, supra note 138 (addressing expanded use of tools by
presidents to thwart predecessors’ regulatory actions in the context of a declining
number of congressional statutes).
163
49 U.S.C. § 32902(f).
164
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (application of the “best system of emission
reduction” in the Clean Air Act’s New Source Performance Standards); 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b) (requiring Endangered Species Act listing decisions to be made “solely on
the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available”)
165
5 U.S.C. § 706.
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developing), such as Australia and Brazil, do call into question the
effect and significance of the principle—or at least the extent to
which it is obeyed in practice.
In grappling with the role of the non-regression principle in
environmental law, these are valid issues to engage with.
Democratic process limits the non-regression principle because,
absent some justification, future decisionmakers ought to be able to
change the course set out today. However, concern about the
enjoyment of environmental rights and about the environmental
and human health consequences from the undoing of law in the
future are precisely the sort of circumstances that justify a departure
from the typical majoritarian rules. Further, recent rollbacks
highlight the importance of this work in establishing the legitimacy
of the principle and the need to reinforce it, to make it more durable.
Acknowledging and implementing the principle, while recognizing
that it has not been universally respected, is nonetheless a key step
in fulfilling human rights with regard to environmental protection.
a. Democracy and Non-Regression
On the surface, democratic values and generally accepted
processes for legislative decision-making in democratic systems
may appear to conflict with the principle of non-regression. To
summarize this challenge in two questions: to what extent may a
government or legislature bind future decisionmakers? Is it antidemocratic to prohibit a future legislature or executive authority
from revoking or altering environmental laws and policies?
In general, a foundational principle in democratic systems is the
idea that a representative legislative body that acts may repeal that
act by following the same process. When a statute is enacted with
an environmental standard or a piece of legislation sets aside a
geographic area for preservation, the implication is that the same
decision-making body may change its mind and reverse course. In
other words, statutory law does not typically provide a vested right
to the continuation of that law. 166 Under the non-regression
principle, on the contrary, once a level of environmental restriction
is applied, future action cannot undo it. Future hands are tied.
166
See, e.g., Michel Prieur, Le Principe de Non Regression “Au Coeur” du Droit de
l’Homme a l’Environnement, 1 REVISTA DE DIREITO E SUSTENTABILIDADE 133, 134 (2015)
(Braz.).
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This critique of the non-regression principle merits response but
does not defeat the principle. Small-d democrats may wish to avoid
a “dead hand” problem that ties current policy to previous
conservation efforts. 167 However, failure to incorporate a nonregression principle into decision-making means that future
generations are potentially exposed to the same or worse
environmental harms that today threaten a panoply of human
rights.
Dworkin’s description of legal principles includes the idea that
any one principle will exist and function in tension with other
principles and with other legal considerations. 168 This equitable
weighing is both expected and consistent with the rule of law.
Constitutional democracy introduces a hierarchy among legal rules,
limiting the discretion of lawmakers in the normal, legitimate and
democratic legislative process to actions within the scope of
constitutional authority—binding democratic bodies to a previously
identified set of norms.
Returning to the Costa Rican application of the non-regression
principle, the judiciary has recognized that the principle is simply
one among a set of constitutionally grounded restrictions on
legislative decision-making. 169 The substance of that restriction
depends on the law or norm previously put in place—i.e., the level
of environmental protection that cannot be walked back without
sufficient justification.
Judges can indeed apply the principle of non-regression
consistently with democratic governance, just as they treat any
defined right that might be abridged by government action. Perhaps
the most important reason why a polity may enshrine fundamental
rights in a constitutional document is to prevent future action that
jeopardizes the exercise of such rights—even and perhaps especially
when the action is approved by democratic means.170 The concept
of human rights per se envisions this antidemocratic problem,
placing negative limitations and positive obligations on state action,

167
On the dead hand problem generally in constitutional law, see, for
example, Andrew Coan, The Dead Hand Revisited, 70 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1 (2020).
168
See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 11, at 26.
169
See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
170
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (discussing
the countermajoritarian difficulty of judicial review).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss3/1

2022]

Never Look Back

599

even in states with democratic decision-making processes. 171 The
use of the non-regression principle to overturn a deregulatory
action—in furtherance of the human right to a healthy
environment—is no different than relying on any other
constitutional human right to block a majority-supported
infringement to that right.
The judiciary can apply the principle by requiring
proportionality and adequate justification for any action that
implicate rights guaranteed by the state. In the environmental
context, as the Costa Rican court held, environmental protection can
only be rolled back if supported by scientific evidence or indication
that other countervailing public interests are at stake.172 Critically,
applying the non-regression principle means that the decisionmaker
seeking to walk back environmental law must bear the burden of
proof in establishing how and why the action is justified—e.g., how
the balance of environmental interests at hand should be resolved
with other recognized legal principles and considerations that
safeguard public wellbeing. In this way, present laws and
environmental regulations can claim binding authority on future
leaders without running afoul of democratic ideals.
b. Recent Regressions
Setting aside critiques about whether the non-regression
principle infringes on democratic decision-making, the nonregression principle runs up against a recent track record of
backtracking on environmental commitments. Some of these recent
rollbacks raise questions about whether strict obedience to the nonregression principle can be maintained when political pressure is
strong. The problematic present state of environmental politics
suggests a strong need to reinforce the principle of non-regression—
first by clearly articulating what it is and where it has worked, but
second by grounding it in constitutional provisions, rights, and
171
Or Bassok & Yoav Dotan describe the case for countermajoritarian judicial
review as follows: “[J]udicial review authority serves as a mechanism that ensures
adherences to [a society’s] chosen course, even against the current desires of the
public. Thus, the [countermajoritarian] nature of judicial review authority is
understood as a virtue, since it ensures society will continue in the right direction.”
Or Bassok & Yoav Dotan, Solving the Countermajoritarian Difficulty?, 11 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 13 (2013).
172
See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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other means. If constitutional rights can serve as an effective
response to regressions in one country, those experiences can
provide guidance for other legal systems to do the same. And in the
United States, the story of the Trump Administration to highlight is
the robustness of the administrative law framework in staving off
the systematic regression of environmental protections, even if it did
not do so perfectly.
i.

Four Years of Rollbacks in the United States

In the United States, the essence of the Trump Administration’s
environmental policy from 2017 to 2021 was the repeated violation
of the non-regression principle. The list of examples—rollbacks
announced, begun (and never finished), or completed—is so
extensive that not even a partial treatment can be made here. 173
Various institutions and publications dedicated major resources and
efforts to track the status of environmental deregulatory actions.174
The most significant of these regressions include the United States’
(temporary) departure from the Paris Agreement on climate
change175; the rescission and replacement of the Clean Power Plan
173
See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Kendra Pierre-Louis, The
Trump Administration Is Reversing 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y.
TIMES
(July
15,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trump-environmentrollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/NS87-237C].
174
Harvard Law School maintained a website that tracks federal
environmental regulations that have been or are in the process of being revoked or
rolled back, as well as the status of litigation challenging these regulatory changes.
See Harvard Environmental & Energy Law Program, Regulatory Rollback Tracker,
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/regulatory-rollback-tracker/
[https://perma.cc/FJ3A-T3K6] (last visited Feb. 26, 2021). The tracker now also
covers re-regulatory efforts under the Biden Administration. Id.
175
President Trump and his first EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, prioritized
the exit from Paris as an early statement of the Administration’s isolationist policy
on climate change, announcing the U.S. withdrawal in 2017. Lisa Friedman, Trump
Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreementclimate.html [https://perma.cc/THS5-CJYQ].
The United States formally
submitted its withdrawal from the agreement to the UN on November 4, 2019; per
the terms of the agreement, the withdrawal took effect one year later, on November
4, 2020. Id.; see also Paris Climate Agreement, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/01/20/paris-climate-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/TBT8-NWX8]
(noting that upon his inauguration, one of President Biden’s first acts was to sign a
one-paragraph statement re-accepting and re-joining the Paris Agreement).
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(regulation of CO2 emissions from coal- and natural gas-fired power
plants)176; presidential proclamations slashing the size of national
monuments designated for the preservation of desert ecosystems
and Native American sacred cultural and archaeological sites in
Utah 177 ; and the push to reduce standards for fuel economy and
GHG emissions from cars 178 —the single action from the Obama
Administration that had the greatest projected impact in mitigating
climate change.179
Of course, this was not the first time that the United States had
experienced regression in environmental protection. Many of the
Trump Administration’s tactics, especially in its first year in 2017,
were reminiscent of the first term of the Reagan Administration in
the early 1980s.180 In parallel, both administrations installed some
176
Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission
Guidelines Implementing Regulations (“ACE” Rule), 84 Fed. Reg. 32520, 32522
(2019), vacated, Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 985 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2021), cert. granted
sub nom West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 420 (Oct. 29, 2021).
177
Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 58081, 58085;
Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 58089,
58093. The author and others have argued that these executive actions diminishing
the size of the monuments were illegal. See Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas S.
Bryner & Sean B. Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National
Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2017).
178
The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years
2021–2026 Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 85 Fed. Reg. 24174 (Apr. 30, 2020)
(codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86, 600). This deregulatory push included not
only the weaker federal fuel economy standard, but also the EPA’s effort, contested
in court and now reversed by the Biden Administration, to revoke the state of
California’s authority to regulate GHG emissions from cars and its existing Clean
Air Act waiver covering conventional tailpipe emissions. The Safer Affordable
Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84 Fed. Reg.
51310 (Sept. 27, 2019), repealed by Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFÉ)
Preemption, 86 Fed. Reg. 74,236 (Dec. 29, 2021); Nicholas Bryner & Meredith
Hankins, Trump Administration and California are on Collision Course over Vehicle
Emissions Rules, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 2, 2018, 4:54PM EDT),
https://theconversation.com/trump-administration-and-california-are-oncollision-course-over-vehicle-emissions-rules-100574
[https://perma.cc/QL34Z9GE] (discussing the California wavier).
179
See, e.g., Timothy Cama & Miranda Green, Trump moves to roll back Obama
emission
standards,
THE
HILL
(Aug.
2,
2018,
08:38AM
EDT),
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/400036-trump-submits-rule-toweaken-iconic-obama-car-efficiency-standards [https://perma.cc/W6NS-E8LR]
(noting that “the Obama rules [covering 2012-2025 model year cars] were estimated
to reduce emissions by six billion metric tons” over the life of those vehicles”).
180
See, e.g., Leif Fredrickson et al., History of US Presidential Assaults on Modern
Environmental Health Protection, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 595 (2018); see also Dan
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agency leaders (in cabinet-level and other positions, and throughout
the government, not only in environmental agencies) openly hostile
to the mission of implementing congressionally enacted
environmental laws.181
Out of the Reagan era came some environmental regressions, but
also came a more resilient environmental legal framework. Both the
State Farm and Chevron cases described earlier are products of this
time. 182 State Farm, while neutral on its face, operates with proregulatory and progressive-oriented statutes as a bulwark against
regression.183 Chevron, for its part, allowed the EPA the flexibility to
take an environmentally regressive statutory interpretation. 184
Adherence to the non-regression principle—in tandem with a
statutory interpretation method cognizant of environmental
impacts185—would have altered the outcome in Chevron. However,
in the intervening decades of legislative stagnation, deference to
agencies has more often fostered pro-regulatory moves; not
coincidentally, the sharpest criticism in the past several years comes
from conservative, rather than liberal jurists.186
ii.

Worldwide Environmental Regression

Several other countries have elected leaders in the past decade
who have prioritized similar rollbacks. In Australia, for example,
Labor Party leaders put in place a carbon pricing scheme, which
began in 2012 as a fixed-price tax per metric ton of GHGs emitted
Farber, It’s Déjà Vu All Over Again, LEGAL PLANET (Dec. 20, 2016), https://legalplanet.org/2016/12/20/its-deja-vu-all-over-again-2/[https://perma.cc/9AHV2DUT].
181
See Jeremy Diamond, Eli Watkins & Juana Summers, EPA chief Scott Pruitt
resigns amid scandals, citing ‘unrelenting attacks,’ CNN POLITICS (updated July 5, 2018,
07:16PM EDT), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/scott-pruitt-eparesigns/index.html [https://perma.cc/J8B5-CYDY] (discussing the trajectory of
President Trump’s first EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt, including the various
scandals that preceded his resignation).
182
Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
183
See supra Part IV.B.
184
Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 at 845, 857-59.
185
See Nicholas S. Bryner, An Ecological Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 54
Idaho L. Rev. 3 (2018).
186
See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149-1158 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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and was planned to transition toward a cap-and-trade climate
regulatory system. 187 However, the carbon tax was short-lived:
following an election campaign that turned in part on the policy,
Liberal Party leaders came to power and quickly repealed the
program in 2014.188 Thus, in Australia, the highest per-capita GHG
emitter among major developed countries, climate policy has since
languished.189 In Bolivia, despite legal advances in the recognition
of environmental and indigenous rights, as well as the rights of
nature,190 the past decade has also been marked by regressions in
legal protections. These include changes in protected areas that
relax environmental restrictions and decisions to grant permits and
licenses for the construction of environmentally damaging
transportation infrastructure and pipelines, as well as for the
carrying out of extractive industry projects.191
In Brazil, the past decade has also been marked by pushes to
relax legal protections on forested lands. Since 1965, the country’s
Forest Code has maintained strict limits on the clearing of rural
187
See, e.g., Claudia Irigoyen, Case Study: The Carbon Tax in Australia, CTR. FOR
PUB. IMPACT (May 5, 2017), https://www.centreforpublicimpact.org/casestudy/carbon-tax-australia/ [https://perma.cc/6RBC-TYDN] (describing the
history leading up to Australia’s Clean Energy Act of 2011, the basic elements of the
program, and the subsequent backlash); see also Australia introduces controversial
carbon tax, BBC NEWS (July 1, 2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia18662560 [https://perma.cc/7762-QN48].
188
See, e.g., Lenore Taylor, Australia kills off carbon tax, THE GUARDIAN (July 16,
2014), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/17/australia-killsoff-carbon-tax [https://perma.cc/HUL8-BSUC] (reporting on the Australian
Senate’s vote to repeal the tax and citing then-Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s
“‘pledge in blood’ to ‘axe the tax’”).
189
See, e.g., Charles Komanoff, Australia’s Brief, Shining Carbon Tax, CARBON
TAX CTR. (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.carbontax.org/blog/2020/01/07/australiasbrief-shining-carbon-tax/ [https://perma.cc/UV2R-N7B8].
190
Ley No. 300, 15 Oct. 2012, Ley Marco de la Madre Tierra y Desarrollo
Integral para Vivir Bien [Framework Law of Mother Earth and Integral
Development for Living Well] (Bolivia).
191
See, e.g., Paola Doris Cortés Martinez, El Estado de Derecho Ambiental, el rol
de la Justicia y la importancia del principio de No regresión en materia ambiental (Sept. 8,
2020), https://paoladcortesm.wordpress.com/2020/09/08/el-estado-de-derechoambiental-el-rol-de-la-justicia-y-la-importancia-del-principio-de-no-regresion-enmateria-ambiental/ [https://perma.cc/3BRD-J5P8] (noting that these actions have
taken place both under the government of President Evo Morales and the interim
government of Jeanine Áñez that began leading the country following his ouster in
2019); Anatoly Kurmanaev, In Bolivia, Interim Leader Sets Conservative, Religious Tone,
N.Y.
Times
(Nov.
16,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/16/world/americas/bolivia-anezmorales.html [https://perma.cc/4DY4-NY9R] (discussing the political crisis in
Bolivia and its ramifications).
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forested land, preserving riparian zones and the headwaters of
streams and rivers. 192
In 2012, despite objections from
environmental organizations in the country, Brazil revised its Forest
Code, maintaining strict limits on the clearing of rural forested land
generally, but expanding exemptions and providing immunity for
landholders that had cleared forests in the past.193 While the federal
government under President Lula da Silva’s Workers’ Party from
2002 and 2010 had devoted significant resources and political capital
to controlling deforestation in the Amazon, the cattle ranching and
agricultural lobbies grew in political power in the Party’s governing
coalition under President Dilma Rousseff.194
Current Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, elected in 2018, has
been openly hostile toward existing environmental laws, halting the
demarcation of indigenous lands in the forests and appointing
officials uninterested in enforcing the Forest Code or other statutory
requirements.195 The result of the rollback in legal requirements and
in enforcement is a new, sharp rise in deforestation. 196 Although
deforestation rates remain below the historic highs in the late 1980s,
1990s, and early 2000s, the slowdown in forest clearing has stopped,
and in the period from 2012-2019, has climbed back up—the trend
accelerating since President Bolsonaro took office.197
192
Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de setembro de 1965 (Braz.), superseded by Lei No.
12.651, de 25 de maio de 2012. The author has discussed Brazilian court decisions
interpreting the Forest Code in Nicholas S. Bryner, Brazil’s Green Court:
Environmental Law in the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (High Court of Brazil), 29 PACE
ENV’T L. REV. 470, 486-96 (2012).
193
Lei No. 12.651, de 25 de maio de 2012 [CÓDIGO FLORESTAL] (Braz.),
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/l12651.htm
[https://perma.cc/23CF-H3UU].
194
For example, President Rousseff appointed Kátia Abreu, a noted figure
among the ruralista voting bloc in Congress that pushed for revision of the Forest
Code, as Minister of Agriculture in 2014. See, e.g., Jonathan Watts, Brazil’s ‘chainsaw
queen’ appointed new agriculture minister, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 24, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/24/brazil-agriculture-katiaabreu-climate-change [https://perma.cc/P5T9-A9AD].
195
See, e.g., Ernesto Londoño & Letícia Casado, As Bolsonaro Keeps Amazon
Vows, Brazil’s Indigenous Fear ‘Ethnocide,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/19/world/americas/bolsonaro-brazilamazon-indigenous.html [https://perma.cc/E7EF-J8VC] (reporting on the
concerns of indigenous people in the State of Rondônia, in the Amazon Basin near
the border with Bolivia).
196
See Rhett A. Butler, Amazon deforestation increases for 13th straight month in
Brazil, MONGABAY (May 9, 2020), https://news.mongabay.com/2020/05/amazondeforestation-increases-for-13th-straight-month-in-brazil/
[https://perma.cc/LHE3-56DD].
197
See id.
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iii. Re-establishing the Principle
As a descriptive matter, recent actions like the above raise
questions as to whether decision-makers are likely to be influenced
by the principle of non-regression in environmental law. Dramatic
environmental policy changes arise when governments transition,
particularly when those transitions are led by leaders from different
political parties and ideologies. Political change coincides with
political pressure to change course or undo the policies of
predecessors, as has been the case in the United States, Australia,
Brazil, and other countries that have taken a ‘right turn’ toward anticonservation chief executives over the past decade.198
Calls for regression almost invariably include some form of the
argument that an increase in environmental protection represents a
step backward for economic development.199 Despite a great deal of
evidence that this is a false dichotomy, 200 the zero-sum economic
framing carries popular political weight.
The propensity for recent regressions in many parts of the world
highlights the great need for recognition of the non-regression
principle in environmental law. However, the idea that a legal
principle can prevent these recursions on legal protection for the
198
Even in December 2016, one month before President Trump’s
inauguration, the stance of his administration on environmental issues was clear,
given the makeup of his transition team that had been preparing to take control of
various administrative agencies. See, e.g., Oliver Milman, Trump’s Transition:
Sceptics Guide Every Agency Dealing with Climate Change, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/donald-trumpenvironment-climate-change-skeptics [https://perma.cc/5LDX-SU8Y].
199
For example, in President Trump’s remarks in June 2017 regarding his
intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, the speech was replete with (highly
dubious) claims about job losses and economic impacts projected from U.S.
compliance with the Agreement. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate
Accord,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(June
1,
2017),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/president-trump-announces-u-swithdrawal-paris-climate-accord/ [https://perma.cc/S5DT-UVYV].
200
See, e.g., Marshall Burke, W. Matthew Davis & Noah S. Diffenbaugh, Large
Potential Reduction in Economic Damages under UN Mitigation Targets, 557 NATURE
549 (2018) (modeling net global economic benefits from mitigating climate change).
In the United States, cost-benefit analyses of every major environmental regulation
since the 1980s demonstrate, time and again, the economic benefit of reducing
pollution; further, environmental regulatory transitions typically do not have major
long-term effects on employment in affected industries, or may lead to net growth
in other job sectors. See, e.g., INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, DOES ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
KILL
OR
CREATE
JOBS?
(2017),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/Jobs_and_Regulation_Factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QD6W-TYF4].
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environment during political transitions may seem idealistic.
Effectively making the connection between progressive application
of environmental law and the progressive realization of human
rights can build normative and political support to apply the
principle of non-regression. Despite failings in some respects, the
legal response to many regressions over the past several years has
demonstrated the way in which the principle can and ought to work
in practice to safeguard environmental rights—laying out examples
that can be followed.
First, administrative law has proven an important bulwark
against the excesses of politically driven rollbacks, at least in recent
years in the United States.201 Hasty decisions to rescind or replace
regulations ignored administrative law procedure, failing to
respond to the guideline embodied in the non-regression
principle—that is, that changes must be justified, either by scientific
study that demonstrates an environmental rule is no longer needed
or on a deliberate, rational determination that the change is of
sufficient benefit to other public interests to outweigh
environmental considerations.202 The hasty nature of administrative
actions under President Trump, particularly in 2017, led to a
remarkably poor success rate for the administration in defending
against challenges to deregulatory action, despite strong deference
doctrines in federal courts.203
Commitment to the non-regression principle signifies that
popular political pressure alone for rolling back environmental law
is not a sufficient justification. The idea of this, and similar legal
principles (and constitutional decision-making) is that it can resist
short-term majoritarian impulses. Even in a legal system that does
not recognize a rights-based approach to environmental
conservation, such as the United States, administrative law can slow
down political decisions that harm public interests. While some
scholars have criticized the ‘ossification’ of administrative decisionmaking in the U.S. system, the value of deliberate process and a
requirement for rational, expert decision-making, is that it can serve
as a counterweight to politicking that would undo socially beneficial
regulation.204
See INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, supra note 140.
See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
203
See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
204
See generally Aaron L. Nielson, Optimal Ossification, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1209 (2018) (discussing various critiques of delay in administrative law and
defending ossification as beneficial to perceptions of agency legitimacy).
201

202
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In countries with constitutionally recognized human rights to
environmental protection, this dynamic—defending environmental
law against short-term politics—is ever clearer. The non-regression
principle, as a corollary to the mandate for progressive realization
of environmental rights, means that the political branches’ decisions
are and ought to be constrained. Momentary political decisions to
weaken environmental protection would run roughshod over the
environmental rights of frontline communities and vulnerable
minorities (as well as the diffuse environmental rights enjoyed by
all) and are therefore prohibited.
While setbacks and exceptions to the principle, in practice, are
inevitable, experience in human rights discourse generally suggests
that raising attention to the principle of non-regression—including
an explanation of the examples and applications referred to
throughout this Article—can help develop the normative case for
the principle and build expectations for decisionmakers to
implement it and respect it.
VI. CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL NON-REGRESSION IN A PUBLIC
HEALTH AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
Environmental law today faces an additional challenge. In the
face of contemporary environmental backtracking in several
countries—and in finding appropriate responses to roll regulation
forward—it is important to put the principle of non-regression in the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic that has upended the world and
has led to devastating loss of life.205 The pandemic, as well as the
political and social responses to it, brought on a severe economic
crisis, beginning in the early months of 2020 and continuing as
successive waves of infection hit multiple countries around the
world.206
205
As of February 2022, as reported by Johns Hopkins University, the global
total of deaths related to COVID-19 had surpassed 5.9 million, including over
950,000 deaths in the United States. COVID-19 Dashboard, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.
CTR. FOR SYS. SCI. & ENG’G, https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
[https://perma.cc/UHQ8-YSFY] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
206
In June 2020, the International Monetary Fund projected that the global
economy would decline by 4.9% for the year 2020. See Alan Rappeport, I.M.F.
Predicts Deeper Global Downturn Even as Economies Reopen, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/24/business/imf-world-economicoutlook.html [https://perma.cc/9N4G-TCA6]. Surveys indicate that consumer

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:3

Environmental crises have exacerbated the human impact of
COVID-19, and the economic impact of COVID-19 threatens to
undermine progress in environmental law and policy—both by
diverting all available resources and attention to addressing the
pandemic (in necessary ways) and by adding to the perceived
economic pressure to do away with burdensome or costly
environmental regulations.
Cautionary examples abound. In March 2020, early on in the U.S.
experience with the spreading virus, the EPA issued a
memorandum with a temporary enforcement policy during the
pandemic that kneecapped the EPA enforcement office’s ability to
hold environmental violators accountable. 207 The memorandum
applied the EPA’s enforcement discretion to signal to regulated
industries that the EPA would not be enforcing environmental
monitoring requirements:
In general, the EPA does not expect to seek penalties for
violations of routine compliance monitoring, integrity
testing, sampling, laboratory analysis, training, and
reporting or certification obligations in situations where the
EPA agrees that COVID-19 was the cause of the
noncompliance and the entity provides supporting
documentation to the EPA upon request.208
In Brazil, the Environment Minister, Ricardo Salles, sparked
outrage for expressing that he saw the pandemic as an opportunity
to jam through deregulatory policies while the public and media

pessimism in many countries was worse in 2020 than at the height of the Great
Recession in 2008-2009. See Mara Mordecai & Shannon Schumacher, In Many
Countries, People are More Negative about the Economy Amid COVID-19 than During
Great
Recession,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Sept.
14,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/09/14/in-many-countriespeople-are-more-negative-about-the-economy-amid-covid-19-than-during-greatrecession/ [https://perma.cc/5DFQ-34BU]. In Pew’s study, the United States was
one exception, with seventy-seven percent of Americans saying the current
economic situation was “bad” in 2008/2009 and sixty-nine percent in 2020. Id.
207
U.S. E.P.A., OFF. OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE,
MEMORANDUM: COVID-19 IMPLICATIONS FOR EPA’S ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE PROGRAM (2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202003/documents/oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf [https://perma.cc/KH78P62C].
208
Id. at 3.
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were not paying attention. 209 In a recording from an April 2020
meeting, the Minister was overheard advocating for “efforts now,
while we have a quiet moment in terms of media coverage” of
environmental issues, to “push the herd of cattle through” the
opening.210
The pandemic caused a worldwide economic earthquake. The
rapid and successful development of several vaccines has saved
countless lives, creating hope of eventually bringing the public
health crisis under control.211 Yet we are still locked in debates about
how to recover and reopen society and industry as we confront
additional waves of infections and new variants of the
coronavirus.212
In what will assuredly be a prolonged recovery process, we have
the potential to transform environmental law and policy. But based
on experiences in the United States, China, Brazil, and elsewhere, we
have reason to worry. Economic recession and recovery cycles have,
as in the past, inevitably led to political pressure to cut regulatory
corners.
While the 2020s have begun as a worrisome decade, now is not
a time for backtracking. The principle of non-regression in
environmental law is well documented in national constitutions,
statutes, and regulations; international treaties and declarations; and
in the theory and jurisprudence around human rights and the
environment. The purpose of this Article is in bringing together the
variety of legal expressions of environmental non-regression—to
demonstrate that there is indeed solid legal footing for applying the
principle in political discussions and in judicial review of regressive
executive and legislative actions.
Moving forward, policymakers will need to grapple with the
mismatch between non-regression in environmental law—moving
209
Ministro do Meio Ambiente defende passar ‘a boiada’ e ‘mudar’ regras enquanto
atenção da mídia está voltada para a Covid-19, GLOBO.COM (May 22, 2020),
https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/05/22/ministro-do-meio-ambientedefende-passar-a-boiada-e-mudar-regramento-e-simplificar-normas.ghtml
[https://perma.cc/UC5Z-4M9X] (translated by the author).
210
Id.
211
See, e.g., Smriti Mallapaty, Vaccines are Curbing COVID: Data from Israel
Show Drop in Infections, 590 NATURE 197 (2021).
212
US COVID-10 Cases Caused by Variants, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/transmission/variant-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/227X-NMAN]
(accessed Feb. 27, 2021) (tracking the reported cases of identified SARS-CoV-2 virus
variants B.1.1.7, B.1.351, and P.1 in the United States).
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with two steps forward for every step back—and rapid degradation
of global environmental conditions. 213 Environmental law as its
own field began with great purpose and ambition in the first steps
made fifty years ago. 214 Yet sharp declines in biodiversity, rising
temperatures and seas, growing global GHG concentrations, water
scarcity, increased deforestation, a host of other problems—all
appear, empirically, more severe than just a decade ago.
As we traverse the long-term pandemic response throughout the
world, there will be better examples to follow as well. Economic
recovery policies—if designed with foresight—represent a rare
opportunity to redirect governmental and economic priorities to
facilitate a just, green transition.215 At a time when fossil fuel prices
are low due to demand declines, economic stimulus could cut or
eliminate fossil fuel subsidies for exploration that is no longer
economically viable and instead invest public resources in putting
people to work in building green infrastructure, improving energy
efficiency, and other areas where economic and environmental
interests align. The movement for a Green New Deal predates the
pandemic, but if successful, even in part, will drive a more
environmentally sustainable recovery.216
So long as environmental degradation continues—and so long
as those environmental impacts implicate human health, human life,
and human rights—those who develop environmental protection
under the law must never look back. The environmental rule of law
requires respect for human rights and respect for the principle of
non-regression. May it guide us forward.
213
See Tommy Koh, The Earth Summit’s Legacy: An Assessment, NAT’L UNIV. OF
SINGAPORE:
CTR.
FOR
INT’L
L.
(June
15,
2019),
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/publication/the-earth-summits-legacy-an-assessment/
[https://perma.cc/86MC-CV2E].
214
See e.g., Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment (1972); National Environmental Policy Act (1970), codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
215
Ann Eisenberg’s thorough exposition of the “just transitions” movement
describes two meanings of the concept—to ensure that a low-carbon transition is
“fair to the most vulnerable populations” and to protect “workers and communities
who depend on high-carbon industries from bearing an undue burden of the costs
of decarbonization.” Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 275
(2019).
216
One persuasive case for a Green New Deal is KATE ARONOFF, ALYSSA
BATTISTONI, DANIEL ALDANA COHEN & THEA RIOFRANCOS, A PLANET TO WIN: WHY
WE NEED A GREEN NEW DEAL (2019). The author of this work has also written on
the legal challenges in crafting an effective and equitable Green New Deal.
Nicholas S. Bryner, The Green New Deal and Green Transitions, 44 VT. L. REV. 723
(2020).
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